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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
XI. LABOR LAW
A. Arbitrator's Authority and the Common Law of the Shop
The Congress and the National Labor Relations Board favor
grievance arbitration as a means of settling industrial disputes.' Im-
partial arbitration during the term of a contract permits continu-
ous bargaining to proceed without interruption of business operations.'
A collective bargaining agreement often incorporates the arbi-
tration process to allow for the final resolution of unforeseen dis-
putes without resorting to judicial arbitration.' In the Steelworkers
' In 1947, Congress amended the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No.
198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), by adding
provisions known collectively as the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub.
L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley amendments expressly recognizes Congress' preference
for arbitration as the method for settlement of grievances resulting from application or in-
terpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). The
congressional policy supporting arbitration is explicit or implicit in several other of the
Act's provisions. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976) (policy favoring peaceful resolution of
labor disputes); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (strikes undesirable as burden on economy and inter-
state commerce); 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1976) (governmental resources should promote arbitration
and peaceful collective bargaining).
The National Labor Relations Board's policy of encouraging arbitration reflects the
congressional mandate supporting the use of arbitration procedures. See generally Meltzer,
Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (1967);
Christensen, Private Judges-Public Rights: The Role of Arbitration in the Enforcement
of the National Labor Relations Act, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA
49-82 (American Arbitration Association 1976).
The Third Circuit in Avco Corp. v. Local 787, 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1972), stated the fun-
damental reasons supporting the federal policy favoring arbitration. Id. at 973. First, arbi-
trators are more competent than the courts to interpret labor contracts and resolve the pro-
blems of labor management relations. Id. Second, the process of arbitration contributes to
the maintenance of industrial peace. Id. Third, arbitration is essential to effectuate the par-
ties' contractual intent to settle disputes through an internal dispute resolution process. Id.
Fourth, a suit for damages rather than an injunction ordering arbitration might not repair
the harm done by a strike, and might exacerbate strife between labor and management. Id.;
accord M. DOMKE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (1968).
2 See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1490 (1959).
Professor Cox argues that continuous bargaining is critical when the contracting parties
share an ongoing and interdependent rationship. Id. at 1490-91.
See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970) (arbi-
tration is central institution in voluntary settlement of labor disputes); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (federal policy favors settlement
of labor disputes by arbitrators at plant level). The Supreme Court, describing the import-
ance of arbitration in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960), stated that the grievance process contained in a collective bargaining agreement is at
the "very heart of the system of industrial self-government." Id. at 581. The vast majority of
major collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration of grievances. R. SMITH, L.
MERRIFIELD & D. RORTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION 103 (1980).
In 1974, a survey disclosed that only 5% of the major collective bargaining agreements failed
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Trilogy4 the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged the
contribution of grievance arbitration to the relative stability of
American labor relations.' The Court limited the scope of judicial
review of arbitration decisions by holding that an award is not
reviewable on the merits.' The Supreme Court also found that an ar-
bitrator's award is not enforceable only upon a showing that the ar-
bitrator failed to act within the scope of his authority.7 The
to provide for grievance arbitration. See Cohen, The Search for Innovative Procedures in
Labor Arbitration, 29 ARB. J. 104 (1974).
At common law, courts refused specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
disputes arising in the future. Agar v. Machlew, 2 Sim. & St. 5,418, 423, 57 Eng. Rep. 405,
407 (ch. 1825). The Congress and a number of states subsequently abolished the common-law
rule with respect to commercial disputes when the agreement provided for arbitration by
an impartial third party. See, e.g., United States Arbitration Act, Ch. 392, 61 Stat. 671, 9
U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (creating federal right to enforcement of arbitration agreements in written
contracts concerning commerce and maritime transactions); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (1981)
(agreement to arbitrate enforceable at law); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1982) (arbi-
tration agreement is valid under state law).
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 352 U.S. 448 (1965), the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the proper role of the judiciary in the arbitration process. Id. at 450. The Lincoln
Mills Court held that an agreement recognizing arbitration as the final step in the grievance
arbitration procedure was specifically enforceable as a matter of federal law under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Id. at 459. See generally, Bickel & Well-
ington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1957); Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective
Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1957). Before the passage of § 301(a), federal courts decided
actions seeking to compel arbitration in accordance with state law. Cox, Grievance Arbitra-
tion in the Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. REV. 591, 600-601 (1954).
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court
developed the contours of the federal common law of collective bargaining agreements and
enforcement. In Enterprise Wheel, the Court addressed the standard or review appropriate
for federal courts examining a decision by an arbitrator. 363 U.S. at 596; see infra note 7
(discussing Enterprise Wheel). In Warrior & Gulf Navigation, the Court considered the
sources an arbitrator may look to in determining whether an issue is appropriate for arbi-
tration. 363 U.S. at 578-82; see infra note 12 (discussing Warrior & Gulf). In American
Manufacturing, the Court examined the standard that federal courts should apply in deter-
mining whether a grievance is arbitrable under the collective bargaining contract. 363 U.S.
at 566. See generally Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 360 (1962); Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, October Term 1959,
60 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 919-35 (1960).
- United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)
(federal policy of arbitration promotes industrial stabilization).
I United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) (judiciary should
not weigh merits).
I United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). In
Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme Court announced the finality doctrine covering judicial
review of arbitration awards. Id. at 596. The union in Enterprise Wheel sought reinstate-
ment of certain employees who left their jobs protesting the firing of another employee. Id.
at 595. The arbitrator altered the discharges of the employees to suspensions with backpay.
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Steelworkers Trilogy effectively established the Supreme Court's
recognition of the importance of the finality of an arbitrator's award.'
The terms of the collective bargaining agreement provide the bound-
aries for an arbirator resolving a dispute between a company and a
union.' Though the arbitrator may look for guidance from other sources,
the award is legitimate only when the decision draws its essence from
the contract. 1" In the Steelworkers Trilogy," the Supreme Court held
that an integral part of a collective bargaining agreement is the common
Id. The arbitrator's decision came five days following expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. The company refused to comply with the decision, arguing that the arbi-
trator lacked the authority to order reinstatement with backpay. Id. at 595-96. In upholding
the arbitrator's authority, the Supreme Court ruled that reviewing courts are not to set
aside an arbitrator's decision except in carefully defined circumstances. Id. at 596. The
Court found that an arbitrator's decision is final on the merits, noting that plenary review
by a court on the merits would make meaningless the doctrine that an arbitrator's decision
is final. Id. at 599. The Court reasoned that a reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether
the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the contract. Id. at 598.
The "essence" test recognizes that an arbitrator derives his authority from the con-
tract between the two parties. Id. at 597. Lower courts have attempted to articulate a
clearer standard for judicial review with varying success. See, e.g., International Union of
Electrical Workers v. Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 489 F.2d 768, 769 (lst Cir. 1973) (award
set aside if found faulty); accord Safeway Stores v. Bakery Workers Int'l, Local 111, 390
F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968); International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 145 v. Modern Air
Transp., Inc., 495 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir.) (decision reversible if lacking in foundation or
fact), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123,
1128 (3d Cir. 1969) (decision reviewable if arbitrator shows manifest disregard of the agree-
ment); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery Workers Int'l Union, 412 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1959)
(award reversed if not plausible); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d
238, 243 (5th Cir. 1961) (arbitrator violates authority if decision arbitrary, capricious, or not
adequately grounded in contract); Newspaper Guild v. Tribune Pub. Co., 407 F.2d 1327, 1328
(9th Cir. 1969) (award set aside if decision discloses interpretation not possible for honest in-
tellect to reach).
' Commentators view the Steelworkers Trilogy as indicating a strong federal policy
supporting arbitration to settle disputes relating to the interpretation or application of col-
lective bargaining agreements, and as limiting the role of the courts. E.g., Davey, The
Supreme Court and Arbitration the Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138,
142 (1960); Gregory, Enforcement of Collective Agreements by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REV.
883, 886-88 (1962); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining,
28 U. Cm. L. REV. 464, 485-87 (1961); Wallen, Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Arbitra-
tion: An Arbitrator's View, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 295, 299 (1961); Wellington, Judicial Review
of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 471, 483 (1962).
' See, e.g., Detroit Coil Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, Lodge No. 82, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir.) (arbitrator confined to application of
bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); Mistletoe Express Serv. v. Motor
Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d 692, 694 (10th Cir. 1977) (arbitrator's award upheld unless
contrary to provisions of contract); Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Union, Local
1645, 362 F.2d 677, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1966) (arbitrator's authority limited to powers conferred
in contract).
" United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97; see
supra note 7 (courts review limited).
" See supra text accompanying notes 4-7 (discussing Steelworkers Trilogy).
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law of the particular plant.12 An arbitrator thus may consider the past
practices of the parties to supplement and furnish the specific provisions
of the labor agreement. 3 In Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v.
Local No. 684, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,4 the Fourth
Circuit considered whether a court must admit evidence of the common
law of the shop in determining whether an arbitrator exceeded the
authority granted by a collective bargaining agreement. 5
In Norfolk Shipbuilding, Local No. 684 of the International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers (the union) filed a grievance for arbitration
after Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. (Norfolk Shipbuilding or the
company) fired a union member for twice refusing to work overtime."6
The arbitrator found that the employee unjustifiably refused the com-
12 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960); see
supra note 4 (Steelworkers Trilogy outlined contours of federal law governing arbitration).
In Warrior & Gulf, the union objected to the contracting out of certain maintenance work.
363 U.S. at 575-76. The labor agreement did not address the subject of contracting out but
excluded from arbitration matters which were strictly functions of management. Id. at 576.
The union filed suit to compel arbitration. Id. at 577. The district court granted the com-
pany's motion to dismiss, ruling that the agreement did not allow the arbitrator the right to
review the defendant's business judgment and that contracting out was strictly a function
of management within the meaning of the exclusionary language of the arbitration clause.
168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 269
F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court reversed and held that the company must sub-
mit the issue to arbitration. 363 U.S. at 585. The Court noted that the collective bargaining
agreement covers the whole employment relationship. 363 U.S. at 578-79. The Court found,
however, that the contract is a generalized code covering many situations unanticipated by
the drafters. Id. The Court reasonsed that in construing the agreement, the express terms of
the contract are not the arbitrator's only source of law. 363 U.S. at 581-82. The Court held
that the industrial common law, composed of the practices of the industry and the shop, is
equally a part of the contract. Id.
Due to the nature and scope of the collective bargaining agreement, a number of un-
written understandings and informal arrangements develop as responses to environmental
pressures and changes. Nurse, Custom and Practice in Labour Relations in the United
States: A Review of the Evidence, 30 LAB. L.J. 38, 39 (1979). Over time, such responses are
likely to give rise to a body of customs, representing the accepted norms of the workplace.
Id. Arbitrators have found a variety of established practices by employers to constitute the
common law of a shop. See, e.g., Ruralist Press, Inc., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 549, 551 (1968)
(Holly, Arb.) (washup period); Sherwin Williams Co., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 490, 493-94 (1968)
(Kates, Arb.) (lunch period arrangements); Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 50 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 417, 421 (1968) (Duff, Arb.) (meal and taxi allowance); Formica Corp., 44 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 467, 468 (1965) (Schmidt, Arb.) (paid work breaks); Northland Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 23 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 277, 280 (1954) (Levinson and Sigal, Arb.) (maternity leaves of
absence); Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 197, 198 (1947) (Jacobs, Arb.) (notice to
union required before employee's discharge for dishonesty).
" See generally Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: "The Common Law of
the Shop" v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65 (1977).
" 671 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 798.
11 Id. The employee received a written warning in August 1979 when he refused to
work overtime. Id. The company discharged the employee when he again refused to work
overtime in October 1979. Id. The discharge notice stated that the reason for termination
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pany's request to work additional time and was therefore subject to
disciplinary action."7 The arbitrator, however, found mitigating cir-
cumstances and changed the discharge to a suspension and ordered the
company to reinstate the employee without backpay.5
Norfolk Shipbuilding brought suit in district court seeking modifica-
tion of the arbitrator's decision and a declaration that the award exceed-
ed the arbitrator's authority as defined by the collective bargaining
agreement. 9 The district court held that since the arbitrator determined
the company had cause to terminate the employee the arbitrator did not
have the authority to alter the discharge. 0 The district court found that
the language of the collective bargaining agreement preserved the com-
pany's right to discharge an employee for violation of a company rule.'
was the employee's violation of the company rule forbidding willful failure to observe in-
structions, or neglecting of duty with a belligerent attitude. Id. at 798-99.
11 Id. at 799. The collective bargaining agreement provided that the company retained
the right to discharge any employee for cause, and such right of discharge included the
right to suspend or otherwise discipline an employee in lieu of discharge. 671 F.2d at 799.
The agreement also stated that violation of company rules not inconsistent with the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement constituted just cause for discharge. Id. In ad-
dition to the provisions concerning the company's right to discharge or discipline an
employee, the agreement between Norfolk Shipbuilding and the union also withheld from
the arbitrator the power to change, alter or amend the language of the contract. Appendix
at 33, Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Local No. 684, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers,
671 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1982).
At common law, employees were subject to discharge without notice at any time. Sum-
mers v. Phenix Ins. Co., 50 Misc. 181, 182, 98 N.Y.S. 226, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1906). With the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, Congress prohibited employer
discharge of employees for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging union membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). The Act also encourages the collective bargaining process by re-
quiring that the parties bargain in good faith. Id. § 158(a)(5). The National Labor Relations
Board's policy favoring grievance arbitration promoted the inclusion of grievance arbitra-
tion procedures in collective bargaining agreements; see supra note 1 (NLRB favors
grievance arbitration process). The grievance procedure further circumscribed the
employer's freedom to discharge by requiring that the parties resolve the differences
resulting in discharge. See Wilder, Discharge in the "Law" of Arbitration; 20 VAND. L. REV.
81, 82 (1966).
Appendix at 13, Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Local No. 684, Int'l Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 671 F.2d 797 (1982). In reducing the disciplinary sanction from discharge to
suspension, the arbitrator noted that the employee's attendance record was excellent. Id.
The arbitrator also found the employee generally cooperative concerning overtime work,
except for the two incidents. Id. at 14. The arbitrator thus concluded that these mitigating
circumstances required a lesser penalty. Id.
1, 671 F.2d at 799. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act permits
either party to bring suit in district court for violation of a collective bargaining agreement.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
1 Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Local No. 684, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers,
No. 30-621-N (E.D. Va. Feb. 4, 1981).
21 Id. The district court found that in light of the restrictive clause limiting the arbi-
trator's authority and the clear language of the contract, no evidence relating to the com-
mon law of the shop would preclude the company from discharging the employee for viola-
tion of company rules. Id.
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In reaching its decision, the district court refused to admit evidence of-
fered by the union of the company's past practices in disciplining
employees.' The union sought admission of evidence indicating that the
company did not discharge consistently employees violating work rules
to demonstrate that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in modi-
fying the discipline imposed by Norfolk Shipbuilding."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling ex-
cluding admission of evidence of the common law of the shop.24 The
Norfolk Shipbuilding majority recognized that the doctrine of finality
limits the court's review of an arbitrator's award.25 The Fourth Circuit
noted that the court's inquiry only concerned whether the arbitrator's
decision drew its essence from the agreement between the company and
the union." The majority in Norfolk Shipbuilding found that the
Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co.' required admission of evidence concerning the
company's past practices in disciplining employees.28 The Fourth Circuit
explained that the common law of the shop is an integral part of the col-
lective bargaining agreement between the union and the company." The
I Id. The union offered evidence to show that discharge was not the usual disciplinary
sanction for employees violating company rules, including refusal to work overtime. Id. The
union attempted to prove that Norfolk Shipbuilding traditionally followed a policy of pro-
gressive discipline by administering more severe penalties for successive violations of com-
pany rules. Id. The union also sought to introduce evidence that Norfolk Shipbuilding ac-
cepted three.previous arbitration decisions in which the arbitrator reduced the penalty of
discharge to a period of suspension without pay. 671 F.2d at 799.
2 Id.
24 671 F.2d at 800.
" Id. at 799; see supra note 7 (plenary review by court makes meaningless doctrine
that arbitrator's decision is final).
" Id. at 799; see supra text accompanying notes 6-7 (Steelworkers Trilogy found arbi-
trator's award must draw essence from contract); see also Chambers v. Beaunit Corp., 404
F.2d 128, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1968) (encouragement of good industrial relations makes im-
perative that courts give effect to bargained for and agreed upon methods of settling
grievances); Western Iowa Pork Co. v. National Bhd. Packinghouse & Dairy Workers, Local
No. 525, 366 F.2d 275, 277 (8th Cir. 1966) (decision of arbitrator will not be questioned by
courts as long as arbitrator acted within scope of authority); United Steelworkers v. Caster
Mold & Mach. Co., 345 F.2d 429, 431 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (arbitrator may broadly con-
strue agreement with all doubts being resolved in favor of arbitrator's authority).
2 363 U.S. 574 (1960); see supra note 12 (discussion of Warrior & Gulf Navigation).
1 671 F.2d at 799-800.
Id. In Warrior & Gulf, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, asserted that
too many problems and too many unforeseen contingencies arise to make the words of the
collective bargaining agreement the exclusive source of rights and duties. 363 U.S. at 579-80
(quoting Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1498-99 (1959)).
Due to the institutional characteristics and nature of the bargaining process, a common law
of the shop is needed to implement and furnish the content of the agreement. 363 U.S. at
579-80 (quoting Cox, supra at 1499). Mr. Justice Douglas also drew from the late Dean
Shulman of the Yale Law School, who points out that the contract resulting from negotia-
tions is a compilation of diverse provisions providing more or less specific standards which
19831
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Norfolk Shipbuilding court concluded that absent consideration of the
commmon law of the shop, the district court could not determine
whether the arbitrator breached the authority granted under the con-
tract in reducing the employee's disciplinary sanction from a discharge
to a suspension.' The majority, therefore, remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement
incorporated any past practices by Norfolk Shipbuilding giving the ar-
bitrator authority to modify the penalty imposed by the company."
The dissent in Norfolk Shipbuilding rejected the majority's holding
that a court must consider evidence relating to the common law of the
shop in deciding whether an arbitrator's decision exceeded the authority
conferred by an agreement." The dissent pointed out that the express
terms of the contract between Norfolk Shipbuilding and the union
granted the company discretion to discharge or suspend an employee
violating company work rules.' The dissent argued that the arbitrator's
reduction of the disciplinary sanction from discharge to suspension effec-
tively inserted into the collective bargaining agreement a system of pro-
gressive discipline. 4 The dissent noted that the union sought such a
disciplinary system during the prior contract negotiations, but Norfolk
Shipbuilding specifically rejected the proposal. The dissent contended
require reason and judgment in their application. Id. at 580; see Shulman, Reason, Contract
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1005 (1955)); Shulman argues that some
agreements do little more than leave problems to future consideration with an expression of
hope and faith. 363 U.S. at 580; Shulman, supra at 1006. See generally Aaron, Arbitration
Decisions and the Law of the Shop, 29 LAB. L.J. 536 (1978); Strong, Industrial Common
Law, 12 LAB. L.J. 308 (1961).
1 671 F.2d at 800.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 800-801; see also Detroit Coil Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 82, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1979) (past practices of shop
cannot act as waiver of plain and unambiguous contractual provision).
3 671 F.2d at 800; see supra note 17 (discussing contract provision preserving com-
pany's flexibility to impose disciplinary penalties).
671 F.2d at 800. Progressive discipline usually provides that the employer must give
a warning for the first offense, a layoff for the second offense, and a discharge for the third
offense, or some other procedure allowing an increase in the severity of the punishment for
each additional violation. See Wilder, supra note 17 at 87. The progressive discipline im-
presses upon the employee at the time of each offense the necessity of correcting the viola-
tion, thus providing additional opportunity and incentive to comply with the company's
rules. Commercial Steel Casting Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 286, 290 (1962) (Kates, Arb.). If the
contract provides for a system of progressive discipline, the arbitrator usually will not allow
the company to vary the graduated disciplinary sanctions. Id.
" 671 F.2d at 800. The dissent noted that the Second Circuit in Torrington Co. v.
Metal Prod. Workers Union Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966), found that while an arbi-
trator may resolve a question never raised during negotiations on the basis of prior prac-
tice, the arbitrator should not assume the contract confers a benefit which the parties
discussed during negotiations but omitted from the final agreement. Id. at 681. An arbi-
trator may look to the negotiating history to determine the intent of the parties in applying
the substantive provisions of the bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Francesco's B., Inc. v.
[Vol. 40:459
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that the majority's decision essentially allowed the union the opportuni-
ty to achieve through arbitration a gain denied at the bargaining table.2 6
The dissent also asserted that the majority's conclusion in Norfolk
Shipbuilding contradicted previous Fourth Circuit decisions concerning
an arbitrator's authority to vary a disciplinary action imposed by an
employer. 7 In Monongahela Power Co. v. Local No. 2332,38 the collective
bargaining agreement prohibited strikes and work stoppages and pro-
vided the employer with an unqualified right to discharge or discipline
any employee engaged in an illegal work stoppage. 9 The Fouth Circuit in
Monongahela Power found that under the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the right to discipline employees engaged in an illegal strike
rested solely with the employer and that the arbitrator had no right to
review, amend, or alter the discipline imposed by the employer."
Similarly, in Textile Workers Union, Local 1386 v. American Thread
Co.,4 the Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of an arbitrator's decision
altering a company's displinary penalty against an employee for miscon-
duct involving the improper operation of a machine.2 The collective
bargaining agreement in American Thread granted the company the
right to discipline or discharge employees for just cause.43 The American
Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, Local 28, 659 F.2d 1383, 1388-89 (9th
Cir. 1981) (arbitrator may consider parties' intention in drafting agreement); United Auto.
Workers v. White Motor Corp., 505 F.2d 1193, 1193 (8th Cir. 1974) (arbitrator may examine
agreement history), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); see also Kagel, Arbitration and Public
Policy 10, 12 n.4 (Proceeding of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting National Academy of Arbi-
trators (1961)) (parties not subject to questions omitted from agreement).
671 F.2d at 800.
Id. at 800-801.
566 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976). In Monongahela Power, the employer imposed suspen-
sions on all employees participating in an illegal strike. Id. at 1197-98. To minimize interrup-
tion to business, the company staggered the affected employees' suspension over a period of
several months. Id. at 1198. The arbitrator upheld the company's right to discipline the
employees but ordered the company to conclude all suspensions within 60 days. Id.
29 Id. at 1199-1200.
40 Id. at 1200. The Monongahela Power court reasoned that the reservation of a right
to either discipline or discharge for cause is ineffective if the arbitrator reviews the com-
pany's disciplinary action on the basis of appropriateness. Id. The Fourth Circuit in
Monongahela Power concluded that to allow the arbitrator to review the appropriateness of
the penalty in light of the contract language would violate the specific provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1200-1201; see also City Elec., Inc. v. Local Union 77,
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 517 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir.) (arbitrator may give his own con-
struction to ambiguous language but is without authority to disregard or modify plain and
unambiguous contract provisions), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
1' 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961). In American Thread, the company discharged an
employee for a third offense in permitting a lap to run through a carding machine. Id. at 895.
The arbitrator found that no question existed concerning employee's guilt but found that
the offense did not amount to just cause for discharge. Id.
42 Id. at 901.
' Id. at 897-98. In American Thread, the agreement stated that just cause for termina-
tion existed when an employee failed to perform his job properly in accordance with com-
pany standards. Id. at 898.
1983]
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Thread court ruled that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
distinguishing the just cause required for discharge and the just cause
needed to impose a lesser penalty.44 The Norfolk Shipbuilding dissent
argued that in light of the clear and unambiguous language contained in
the contract between Norfolk Shipbuilding and the union, the Mononga-
hela Power and American Thread decisions precluded consideration by
the arbitrator of evidence outside the collective bargaining agreement.
4
1
The divergence between the majority and the dissent in Norfolk
Shipbuilding reflects the continuing inconsistency by the federal courts
in determining the finality of arbitration awards.46 The Norfolk Ship-
building majority's decision illustrates a broad application of the
Supreme Court's finding in Warrior & Gulf Navigation that the express
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are not the sole
repository of the requirements of the contract. 1 Other courts also sup-
port the proposition that contract language restricting interpretation of
the labor agreement to the express provisions of the document will not
constrain significantly the authority of the arbitrator.48 In Holly Sugar
Corp. v. Distillery Workers International Union,49 the Ninth Circuit held
" Id. at 899-901. The agreement in American Thread provided that the arbitrator
should make no award affecting a change, modification, or addition to the agreement. Id. at
898. The agreement also limited the arbitrator strictly to the facts submitted in the hearing,
the evidence before him, and the terms of the contract. Id. The Fourth Circuit in American
Thread concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in the Steelworkers Trilogy did not in-
tend that the courts allow an arbitrator to violate the clear and unambiguous terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 899.
,s 671 F.2d at 800.
See generally Aaron, Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REV.
41 (1967); Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427 (1969).
363 U.S. at 578. In implementing the Warrior & Gulf Navigation Court's finding that
the common law of the shop is an integral part of the collective bargaining agreement,
courts rely upon several aids in addition to past practices and the negotiation history to
ascertain the intent of the parties. See, e.g., Marble Prod. Co. v. Local 155, United Stone
Workers, 335 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1964) (courts may consider relevant legislation if proba-
tive of the sense of the agreement); Truck Drivers Local Union No. 100 v. Quick-Freeze Cold
Storage, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 725, 730 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (industrial efficiency considerations rele-
vant to extent collective bargaining agreement permits).
" See Lodge No. 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292 F.2d
112, 118 (5th Cir.) (no-modification clause does not prevent arbitrator from implying rights
not expressed in collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961); see also
R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 593 (1976) (doubtful that award violates modification
clause if arbitrator considers only contract, negotiations, and plant practices).
'" 412 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1969). In Holly Sugar, the controversy pertained to the time
period covered by two successive collective bargaining agreements and concerned a
disagreement about the proper wage and job classification of an employee. Id. at 901. The
arbitrator found that the company created a new job classification in violation of the agree-
ment and excused the union's delay in the filing of the grievance. Id. at 904. The Ninth Cir-
cuit deferred to the arbitrator's award, holding that the arbitrator was free to find the
union's delay justified by the employer's failure to notify the union of the challenged action.
Id.
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that an arbitrator had implied authority to excuse a union's failure to file
a grievance within the requisite time, even in the face of a no-
modification provision in the collective bargaining agreement. 0 The Holly
Sugar court found that an arbitrator's consideration of prior practices,
the history of the contract negotiations, and provisions of the current
collective bargaining agreement met the requirement that the award
must draw its essence from the contract." The Ninth Circuit in Holly
Sugar concluded that once the essence test is satisfied, the court's per-
missible scope of judicial review ends.2
The Second Circuit's decision in Torrington v. Metal Products
Workers Union, Local 164511 is representative of a contrary approach
which emphasizes closer judicial scrutiny of the arbitrator's authority. 4
In Torrington, the collective bargaining agreement contained an express
limitation on the arbitrator's authority.' The arbitrator, however, looked
to the common law of the shop to determine whether the contract pro-
o Id. at 904-905.
51 Id. at 905. The Holly Sugar court relied on the dissent in Torrington Co. v. Metal
Prod. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1966) (Feinberg, J., dissent-
ing), for the correct statement of the law. 412 F.2d at 905. See infra text accompanying
notes 52-56 (discussing majority opinion in Torrington). The linth Circuit in Holly Sugar
agreed with the Torrington dissent that an arbitrator may consider extrinsic evidence even
in light of a contract's no-modification clause. 412 F.2d at 905.
52 Id.
0 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966). In Torrington, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling, which refused enforcement of an arbitrator's award. Id. at 682. After examin-
ing past practices and the negotiation history of the parties, the arbitrator held that the col-
lective bargaining agreement contained an implied provision that the employer would allow
employees one hour off with pay to vote on election day. Id. at 679.
' See also Local 342, UAW v. T.R.W., Inc., 402 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 910 (1969); Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. Local 1549, UAW, 451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971).
In T.R.W., the arbitrator found that the employees in question violated the strike provision
of their agreement. 402 F.2d at 728-29. the agreement provided that the employer could
take disciplinary action, including discharging any employee violating the strike provision.
Id. at 728. The arbitrator subsequently altered the discharge, ordering reinstatement of the
employees. Id. at 729. In reversing the arbitrator's modification, the court held that the
language of the contract gave the company the right to discharge the employee. Id. at
731-32. The court noted the language of the contract was not ambiguous and did not require
interpretation by the arbitrator. Id. at 731.
Similarly, in Amanda Bent Bolt, twenty-eight employees violated the no-strike clause
included in the collective bargaining agreement and were therefore subject to discharge.
451 F.2d at 1278. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the contract reserved determination of
the severity of the penalty to the company and was not the prerogative of the arbitrator. Id.
at 1280. The Sixth Circuit therefore vacated the arbitrator's decision reinstating the
discharged employees, holding that the collective bargaining agreements no-modification
clause precluded the arbitrator from altering the employees discipline. Id.
' 362 F.2d at 681. In Torrington, the contract contained a standard no-modification
clause limiting the arbitrator's authority to the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. 362 F.2d at 678 n.2. The Torrington court concluded that the clause indicated
the parties did not intend to confer upon the arbitrator unreviewable power to determine
the scope of his authority with respect to a particular grievance. Id. at 681 n.7.
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hibited the company's unilateral decision to discontinue its policy of giv-
ing employees time off with pay to vote on election day. 6 The Second
Circuit found the award reviewable and reversed the arbitrator's decis-
ion to interpret the express terms of the agreement in light of the par-
ties' prior practices. 57 The Torrington court concluded that the ar-
bitrator's award implied into the collective bargaining agreement a
benefit which the union did not insist upon in contract negotiations.'
The Norfolk Shipbuilding decision represents a retreat from
previous Fourth Circuit decisions which strictly upheld the Supreme
Court's admonition that an arbitrator may not dispense his own brand of
industrial justice. 9 The Second Circuit's decision in Torrington reflects a
sounder application of the Supreme Court's decisions in the Steel-
workers Trilogy. 0 The Torrington rationale correctly recognizes the
proper role of past practices in interpreting a collective bargaining
agreement. 1 The Second Circuit noted that an arbitrator appropriately
utilizes the common law of the shop to supplement or interpret an am-
biguity in the agreement, but not to alter an express and unambiguous
provision of the contract.2 The Torrington decision upholds the sanctity
Id. at 681.
5 Id. at 682. The Torrington court concluded that the arbitrator's decision on the
merits is final concerning questions of fact. Id. at 680. However, noting that the agreement
limited the arbitrator's authority, the court found that the standard of review established
by the Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel authorized judicial examination of an award
when the arbitrator exceeded the limits of his contractual authority. Id. at 680.
" Id. at 682; see Truck Drivers Union Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th
Cir. 1964). In Ulry-Talbert, the arbitrator held that the company justifiably disciplined the
employee but altered the penalty from discharge to reinstatement without backpay. Id. at
563. The collective bargaining agreement in Ulry-Talbert precluded the arbitrator from
substituting his judgment for that of the employer except when management acted arbi-
trarily and in bad faith or in violation of the contract's terms. Id. at 564. Noting that the par-
ties had drawn the contract narrowly, the Eighth Circuit found the arbitrator's award con-
tradicted the clear and unambiguous language of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
566.
, See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960);
see supra text accompanying notes 4-7 (Steelworkers Trilogy limited court's scope of
review unless arbitrator's award fails to draw essence from agreement); see text accompa-
nying notes 37-44 (discussing Mononghela Power and American Thread).
I See Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.
1966). The Torrington court stated that the question of an arbitrator's authority is a
jurisdictional problem. Id. at 680 n.6. The Second Circuit reasoned that judicial review is ap-
propriate after the arbitrator's decision since the court receives the arbitrator's inter-
pretive skills concerning the matter of contractual authority. Id. The Torrington court con-
cluded that to limit judicial review contradicted the Supreme Court's rationale in Enter-
prise Wheel. Id.; see supra note 7 (Enterprise Wheel).
6 See supra text accompanying notes 56-58 (arbitrator may not alter express provis-
ions of collective bargaining agreement).
" 362 F.2d at 682; see Syufy Enter. v. Northern Cal. State Ass'n of IATSE Locals, 631
F.2d 124, 126 n.1 (9th Cir.) (distinguishes cases in which contract contained no modification
clause and therefore arbitrator obliged to discover ambiguity), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983
(1981); see also Boise Cascade Corp. v. United Steelworkers, Local 7001, 588 F.2d 127, 129
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
of the contract and properly enforces the rights and responsibilities
negotiated by the parties under the collective bargaining agreement."
The Second Circuit's approach also promotes industrial stability by
allowing the parties to negotiate an element of certainty into the agree-
ment by assuring that the parties must adhere to the contract's clear
and unambiguous language. 4
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Norfolk Shipbuilding allows an arbi-
trator to expand significantly the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment by going beyond the express provisions of the contract. An arbi-
trator thus may imply rights not expressed in the agreement, even in
the face of a clause expressly forbidding the arbitrator from modifying
the terms of the contract. Applying the finality doctrine accorded to ar-
bitration awards, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Norfolk Shipbuilding
allows an arbitrator to alter subjectively the express terms of the writ-
ten agreement and remain immune from judicial review. 7 By allowing
the common law of the shop to dictate despite the explicit terms of the
contract, the Norfolk Shipbuilding decision forces a party involuntarily
to abandon any flexibility which the party bargained for under the
agreement. 8
The Norfolk Shipbuilding court's decision permitting an arbitrator
(5th Cir.) (arbitrator may consider extrinsic evidence when contract provision arguably am-
biguous), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979); Local 342, UAW v. T.R.W., 402 F.2d 727, 729 (6th
Cir. 1968) (no interpretation needed where contract language unambiguous); Aeronautical
Machinists Lodge 709 v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 521 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (ex-
amination of common law of shop inappropriate when no finding of ambiguous language).
" See F. ELKOURI & E: ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 363 (3d ed. 1973) (general
denial of power to add to, subtract from, or modify agreement provides special justification
for observance of parol evidence rule by arbitrators); see also supra note 40 (Monongahela
Power court noted contract's reservation of rights to discipline is ineffective if arbitrator
alters disciplinary penalty).
" See Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.
1966). In Torrington, the Second Circuit noted that limiting the arbitrator to the confines of
the collective bargaining agreement would stimulate voluntary resort to labor arbitration
and strengthen the labor-management process. Id. at 682. See supra note 1-3 (grievance
arbitration preferred means of settling industrial disputes).
See supra note 48 (court may imply rights not expressed in agreement).
See Lodge No. 12 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292 F.2d
112, 118 (5th Cir. 1961) (standard no-modification clause not major constraint on authority of
arbitrator).
" See Textile Workers Union, Local 1386 v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 901
(4th Cir. 1961) (arbitrator manifested disregard for contract and exceeded limits of authority);
see also Smith & Jones, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of Arbitration
Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1115, 1119-26 (1964) (management
fears arbitrator authority without meaningful review).
" See supra text accompanying notes 34-36 (Norfolk Shipbuilding dissent argues ma-
jority's decision grants union benefit denied by company); see also Note, The Supreme
Court Speaks on Labor Arbitration-Exeunt the Courts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 635, 644-45 (1961)
(allowing arbitrator to infringe on management functions limits flexibility essential to effi-
cient business operations).
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to rely on past practices to vary the contract terms demonstrates the im-
portance of companies imposing consistent penalties in employee disci-
plinary actions.69 The Fourth Circuit's decision also suggests that a com-
pany desiring to retain flexibility in discipline matters should include a
provision in the labor agreement specifically precluding an arbitrator
from altering a disciplinary sanction.7 1 In light of the Norfolk Shipbuild-
ing court's broad language, however, an arbitrator still may alter clear
and unambiguous contract language limiting the authority granted by
the collective bargaining agreement.1
BENTON J. MATHIS, JR.
B. Assessment of Civil Contempt Fines Under Section 301
of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
Congress intended passage of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 (LMRA)' to encourage employers and unions to settle labor
disputes peacefully through collective bargaining agreements.2 Under
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the employer frequently
bargains for the union's waiver of the right to strike to ensure the
9 See supra text accompanying notes 30-31 (on remand district court to decide
whether agreement incorporated past practices allowing arbitrator to alter disciplinary
penalty).
70 See Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The
Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REv. 751, 802 (1965) (judicial review appropriate when
arbitrator exceeded authority under clear and specific provision of agreement); see also
supra note 58 (award violative of narrowly drawn clause limiting arbitrators authority).
"1 See supra text accompanying notes 24-31 (Norfolk Shipbuilding majority requires
consideration by court of past practices in determining arbitrator's authority).
' Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley), Pub. L. No. 101, ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
1 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1976); see H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1947), reprinted in
1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 135, 135 (purpose of Taft-Hartley Act is to provide orderly
and peaceful procedures for preventing employers and employees from interfering with
each other's legitimate rights); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947), reprinted in I
N.L.R.B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, 420 (1948)
(microfiche) (through Taft-Hartley Act Congress advanced collective bargaining agreements
as most effective method of solving industrial relations strife) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Prior to Congress' enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), the
Norris-LaGuardia and the Wagner Acts were the bases of national labor policy. Comment,
Labor Law: Individual Liability for Wildcat Strikes Under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 434, 434 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Wildcat
Strikes]; see Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); National Labor Relations Act of
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employer's uninterrupted business operation.3 The consideration for the
union's promise not to strike is the employer's promise to submit the
union's grievances to binding arbitration.4 To make the provisions of a
1935 (Wagner Act), Pub. L. No. 198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Norris-LaGuardia Act (Norris-LaGuardia)
declared the existence of a national labor policy designed to promote the rights of
employees to organize without employer interference and to promoe collective bargaining
agreements. Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). In addition, Norris-
LaGuardia prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions against labor unions in labor
disputes. Id. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Section 101 provides, in part, that no federal court
has jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or an injunction in a case involving a labor
dispute except in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act. Id. A general interpreta-
tion of the congressional purpose in enacting Norris-LaGuardia suggests that Congress in-
tended to curtail judicial abuse of the injunctive power while facilitating unions' freedom to
organize and bargain collectively. See Louden and Flaherty, Sympathy Strikes, Arbitration
Policy, and the Enforceability of No-Strike Agreements-An Analysis of Buffalo Forge, 45
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 636-37 (1977) (Norris-LaGuardia intended to curb federal courts'
abuse of injunctive power while leaving unions free to pursue organizational and bargaining
efforts); see also Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253 n.22 (1970) (citing
Report of Special Atkinson-Sinclair Committee, A.B.A. Labor Relations Law Sec-
tion-Proceedings 226 (1963)). The Boys Markets Court also recognized that Congress
enacted Norris-LaGuardia primarily because of widespread public disapproval of the
judicial tendency to enjoin strikes in accordance with judicial views of social and economic
policy. Id. The Wagner Act also protected employees' rights of self-organization and
categorized an employer's refusal to bargain collectively as an unfair labor practice. See 29
U.S.C. § 151, 157-158 (1976). The Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts encouraged a substan-
tial increase of union membership in the United States, which in turn precipitated an in-
crease in the number of strikes nation-wide. Note, Labor Law-§ 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act-Individual Liability of Wildcat Strikers, 49 TENN. L. REV. 179, 181-82
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Individual Liability]. Congress perceived a need to curtail strike
activity and responded by passing the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. See Individual Liability,
supra, at 181-82 (Taft-Hartley Act was congressional response to perceived need for legisla-
tion designed to decrease the number of strikes in the United States); S. REP. No. 105,
supra, at 2, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 408 (need for congressional action acute as a
result of increased industrial strife); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
While the Taft-Hartley Act reinforced the national policy in favor of collective bargain-
ing and prevention of employer interference with employee rights, the Act also stressed the
responsibility of labor organizations to help prevent industrial strife and to promote the
free flow of commerce. See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976). In section 141(b), Congress encouraged
labor and management to avoid industrial strife and promote the free flow of commerce by
recognizing each other's legitimate rights. Id. Congress also identified a national policy man-
dating that both labor and management decide that neither has the right to engage in prac-
tices that jeopardize the public interest. Id. The Taft-Hartley Act specifically extended the
definition of unfair labor practice to encompass unfair labor practices by labor organiza-
tions, including union refusal to bargain collectively with an employer and unions' induce-
ment of individual employees to strike. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)-(4)(i) (1976).
See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (collective bargaining
contracts frequently include no-strike clauses to aid employer in maintenance of regular pro-
duction schedules); S. REP. No. 105, supra note 2, at 16, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 422 (chief advantage employer can expect from collective bargaining agreement is
assurance of uninterrupted operation during term of agreement).
' See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (employer's
agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is in exchange for union's agreement not to
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collective bargaining agreement enforceable, Congress enacted section
301 of the LMRA (section 301).1 Section 301 confers jurisdiction on the
federal courts to resolve lawsuits brought by or against labor organiza-
tions for violations of collective bargaining agreements.' Thus, when a
union subject to a no-strike provision in a collective bargaining agree-
ment engages in a work stoppage despite the provision, the employer
may sue the union for breach of the collective bargaining agreement
under section 301.
The principle remedies available to the employer if a union breaches
the no-strike provision are damages actions or injunctive relief.8 The
strike). "Grievances" are disputes concerning the proper interpretation or application of the
collective bargaining agreement. S. CABOT, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
MANUAL-A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE LABOR RELATIONS 17.1[1][a at 17-2 (1978). Arbitration is
a procedure voluntarily selected by the parties to a collective bargaining agreement that
permits the parties to submit grievances to a fair and impartial third person for resolution.
Id. 18.1 at 18-2; see infra note 20 (arbitration is favored method for promoting industrial
peace).
I See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957). The Supreme
Court in Lincoln Mills held that the primary purpose for Congress' enactment of section 301
was to provide a procedure for labor and management to enforce collective bargaining
agreements. Id.
' 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). The Senate report on the LMRA stated that § 301 would
redress the inequality of bargaining power between employers and unions caused by the
Wagner Act. See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 2, at 1-2, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
407-08. The report noted that the Wagner Act granted relief to employees and unions for
management's undesirable labor practices while denying management any redress for the
union's undesirable actions. Id. By authorizing actions against labor unions, § 301 grants
employers a remedy for union activity that violates the collective bargaining agreement and
promotes the mutual responsibility necessary to vitalize the agreement. Id. at 16-17,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 422-23. The Supreme Court has held that § 301(a) is
more than jurisdictional because § 301(a) empowers federal courts to devise a body of
federal law allowing management and labor to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957).
In addition to providing a procedure to enforce collective bargaining agreements, § 301
shields individual union members from liability for damages assessed against the union. See
29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) (courts may not enforce money judgments entered against in-
dividual union members). The problem underlying congressional passage of § 301 evolved in
the Danbury Hatters case. See infra text accompanying notes 101-03 (Danbury Hatters
case).
' See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49, 51
(7th Cir. 1971) (no strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements bind unions). While § 301
contemplates suits by employers against unions, the Supreme Court has held that § 301 also
allows individual employees to sue employers to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
See also Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962) (§ 301 covers suits to vin-
dicate individual employee rights arising from collective bargaining contracts). The
Supreme Court also has held that employees may sue a union under § 301 for breaching the
duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554,
564-65 (1976) (proof of breach of union's duty of fair representation entitles employees to ap-
propriate remedy under § 301); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187-88 (1967) (employee suit
against union for breach of duty of fair representation states cause of action under § 301).
' See Wildcat Strikes, supra note 2, at 439 (damages action is alternative to injunctive
relief under § 301).
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Supreme Court in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.9 stated that an
employer's damages action is permissible under Section 301.10 The Court
held, however, that section 301 did not authorize a damages award
against individual union members when the union authorized or caused
an unlawful strike.11 The Atkinson Court did not address the question of
whether union members would be liable individually for a wildcat strike
that occurred without union authorization.12 In Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Reis,'3 the Supreme Court resolved the issue by holding that sec-
tion 301 does not permit damages actions against union members who
engage in wildcat strikes.14 The Reis Court emphasized the legislative
370 U.S. 238 (1962).
, Id. at 239-41. The Atkinson Court held that the plaintiff employer stated a cause of
action under § 301 by alleging that the union caused a work stoppage despite a clause in the
collective bargaining agreement in which the union promised not to strike over arbitrable
issues. Id. at 240-41. The Court rejected the defendant union's argument that the collective
bargaining agreement bound the employer to arbitrate his claim for damages. Id. The Court
noted that the issue of whether an employer must arbitrate a claim is a matter for the
courts to decide. Id. at 241.
" Id. at 247-49. The Atkinson Court stated that national policy requires that union
liability for damages arising from violations of a no-strike clause not extend to the union's
officers and members. Id. at 249. The Court emphasized that Congress intended to avoid
another Danbury Hatters situation. Id. at 248; see supra note 6 (purpose of passage of §
301); infra text accompanying notes 101-03 (Danbury Hatters case).
,2 370 U.S. at 249 n.7.
,3 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
, Id. at 405. In Reis, employees of Complete Auto Transit, Inc., a transporter of motor
vehicles, engaged in a wildcat strike. Id. at 402. The employees complained that their union,
Teamster Local 332, did not represent the union membership properly in current collective
bargaining negotiations. Id. at 403. The strike violated the no-strike clause in the existing
collective bargaining agreement between the union and Complete Auto Transit, Inc., part
of a national collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union and numerous
other trucking companies. Id. at 402-03. After employees at two other trucking companies
joined in the wildcat strike, the employers brought a § 301 action in district court seeking
injunctive relief and damages against the wildcat strikers individually for losses incurred
because of the unlawful work stoppage. Id. at 402-03. The employers sought no damages
from the union, alleging that the union neither authorized nor approved the strike. Id. at
403.
The district court initially held that the grievance causing the work stoppage was not
subject to arbitration, and therefore that a Boys Market injunction was not permissible. Id.;
see infra note 22 (Boys Markets injunction proper only when underlying labor dispute is
arbitrable under collective bargaining agreement). The district court later concluded that
the dispute involved an arbitrable grievance and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining
the strike. 451 U.S. at 404. Nine months later, the employees moved to dissolve the
preliminary injunction and to dismiss the complaint for damages. Id. The district court
granted the motion to dismiss the injunction because of the Supreme Court's decision in
Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers, holding that injunctive relief is improper unless a
strike is over an arbitrable issue. Id.; see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S.
397, 407 (1976) (union sympathy strike not arbitrable dispute subject to injunctive relief); in-
fra note 22 (discussion of Buffalo Forge). The district court in Reis also dismissed the
employer's claim for damages, holding that an employer may not sue employees seeking
monetary relief for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 451 U.S. at 404. The
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dissolution of the injunction, holding that an in-
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history of section 301 and Congress' intent to shield individual union
members from liability for breach of a no-strike clause in a collective
bargaining agreement.15
As an alternative to the damages remedy for the union's breach of a
no-strike clause, section 301 authorizes district courts to issue an injunc-
tion." Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,17 Congress prohibited
federal courts from issuing injunctive relief in labor disputes, primarily
to curtail judicial abuses of injunctive power."8 The Supreme Court
recognized an exception to the anti-injunction policy of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770."9
junction may be granted even when the cause of the strike is a nonarbitrable issue if an
arbitrable issue caused the continuation of the strike. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis,
614 F.2d 1110, 1114 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 451 U.S. 401 (1981). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the employers' claim for damages against the individual union
members. Id. at 1116. Relying on the legislative history of § 301, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that Congress did not intend to create a cause of action for damages against individual
union members for breach of a no-strike clause. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit
court's holding. 451 U.S. at 405; see infra note 15 (Reis discussion of § 301 legislative
history).
"5 451 U.S. at 408-16. The Reis Court's analysis of the legislative history of § 301 began
with a review of the legislative history of the Case bill, a congressional attempt to provide
additional facilities for the mediation and settlement of labor disputes. Id. at 408-10; see
H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (Case bill). The Reis Court asserted that § 10 of the
Case bill was highly relevant in ascertaining the congressional intent underlying § 301. 451
U.S. at 408; see H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), 92 CONG. REC. 765 (1946) (§ 10 of Case
bill). Section 10 authorized either party to a collective bargaining contract to maintain a suit
for damages for breach of the contract in federal district court. Id. The Senate version of
§ 10 provided that an employer could discharge an employee who participated in a strike
that the union did not authorize. 92 CONG. REC. 5705-06 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Taft). The
Reis court emphasized that the Senate version stopped short of proposing that individual
employees be held liable in damages for engaging in authorized strikes. 451 U.S. at 409-10;
92 CONG. REC. 5705-06 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Taft) (individual union members not responsi-
ble for union violations of collective bargaining agreements). President Truman subsequently
vetoed the Case bill. See Case Bill Veto on H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), 92 CONG.
REC. 6798 (1946).
In analyzing the events leading to congressional passage of § 301, the Reis Court noted
that House members proposed a bill that allowed a damages action against individual union
members engaging in certain types of unlawful concerted activity. 451 U.S. at 412. The Reis
Court emphasized, however, that the Senate altered the language of the proposed legisla-
tion, limiting damages actions to claims against unions, primarily to avoid a repetition of the
Danbury Hatters situation. Id. at 412-13; see infra text accompanying notes 101-03 (Danbury
Hatters case).
"6 See Cabot, supra note 4, 17.214] at 17-10 (employer's principle remedy for union
violation of no-strike clause is injunction).
17 Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)).
" See supra note 2 (Norris-LaGuardia intended to curtail judicial abuse of injunctive
power).
"9 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1969). In Boys Markets the plaintiff employer and defendant union
were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that contained a no-strike clause and pro-
vided that all labor disputes were subject to arbitration. Id. at 238-39. The union engaged in
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In Boys Markets, the Court noted that arbitration of labor grievances is
preferable to work stoppages" and that no-strike clauses must be en-
forceable to be effective consideration for the employer's promise to arbi-
trate union complaints.2 The Court therefore held that when the
grievance underlying a labor dispute is arbitrable under a collective
bargaining agreement,22 a court may issue an injunction under section
301 to prohibit a union-authorized strike.23
a work stoppage when a supervisor refused to use union labor to rearrange certain mer-
chandise. Id. at 239. The employer filed a petition in state court seeking a temporary
restraining order (TRO), a preliminary and permanent injunction, and specific performance
of the arbitration provision. Id. at 239-40. The state court issued a TRO forbidding the con-
tinuation of the strike. Id. at 240. The union then removed the case to a federal district
court. Id. Concluding that the dispute was arbitrable under the labor agreement and that
the strike violated the agreement, the district court enjoined the strike. Id.
See id. at 241 (congressional policy sought to promote peaceful settlement of labor
disputes through arbitration). The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions commonly refer-
red to as the Steelworkers Trilogy, emphasized the importance of the arbitration process to
the federal policy of promoting industrial peace through the collective bargaining process. 6
T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW 27.01[31 at 27-11 (4th ed. 1982); see United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (courts must uphold arbitrator's inter-
pretation of collective bargaining agreement); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (arbitration process is vehicle that gives meaning
and content to collective bargaining agreement); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1960) (courts must uphold congressional decisions that arbitration is
preferred method for settling grievance disputes).
" 398 U.S. at 247-48. The Boys Markets Court noted that an injunction is the
employer's most expeditious method of enforcing the union's no-strike obligation. Id. at 248.
To deprive the employer of injunctive relief could result, the Court reasoned, in a loss of
employer incentive to enter into arbitration agreements. Id.
2 See CABOT, supra note 4, 17.214][c] at 17-12. The determination of whether a labor
dispute is arbitrable so that a Boys Markets injunction is proper depends on certain prere-
quisites. Id. The collective bargaining agreement must contain an arbitration provision. Id.
Furthermore, the strike must be over an issue the parties are bound to arbitrate. Id. An in-
junction is not proper when the arbitration obligation has expired, terminated, or when the
existing arbitration clause does not cover the particular dispute. Id. When an agreement
contains a grievance procedure, but arbitration is not binding or mandatory, injunctive
relief is not appropriate. Id.
The Supreme Court recently clarified the Boys Markets arbitration requirement. See
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1976). In Buffalo Forge, the
Court held that a federal court had no jurisdiction to enjoin a union from honoring another
union's picket line. Id. at 412-13. The Court reasoned that because the sympathy strike did
not involve a dispute subject to the arbitration provisions of the contract, the case did not
fall within the Boys Markets exception. Id. at 407-08.
See 398 U.S. at 253-54 (injunction appropriate when collective bargaining contract
contains arbitration procedure). The Boys Markets Court, in providing for injunctive relief
under section 301, reasoned that significant changes in labor policy occurred in the period
between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Boys Markets case. Id. at 251. The Court noted
that the policy underlying Norris-LaGuardia, protecting weak unions against judicial abuses
of the injunction power, was no longer an urgent labor concern. Id.; see supra note 2 (Con-
gress intended passage of Norris-LaGuardia to curb judicial abuses of injunctive power).
Rather, the Court determined, labor organizations grew in strength and size and congres-
sional emphasis shifted from protection of labor unions to the encouragement of collective
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Once a court properly issues a Boys Market injunction, the union's
failure to honor the injunction and end the strike could result in either a
civil or criminal contempt citation. 4 In distinguishing between civil and
criminal contempt, courts traditionally examine the ultimate purpose of
the contempt sanction.' If the purpose of the court-imposed sanction is
to compel obedience to the court's order or to provide compensation to
the opposing party for losses suffered as a result of a party's non-
compliance, then the courts consider the contempt civil. 6 If the purpose
of the contempt sanction is punitive and vindicates the authority of the
court and the party cannot remove the sanction by compliance with the
bargaining for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes. 398 U.S. at 251. The Court
therefore concluded that injunctions issued to enjoin breaches of no-strike and arbitration
agreements would foster the arbitration process without undermining the purpose of
Norris-LaGuardia. Id. at 251-53.
24 See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 261 (1947) (employer may secure
relief for union's failure to obey TRO through contempt order); In re Chiles, 89 U.S. (22
Wall.) 157, 168 (1874) (disobedience of injunction is contempt of court); United States v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 96 F. Supp. 428, 436 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (when union members
conduct work stoppage despite TRO, union is guilty of contempt); see also F. FRANKFURTER
& N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 126 (1930 (violation of injunction whether injunction
is temporary, restraining or final, is contempt of court); 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 65.02[4] (2d ed. 1982) (court may use injunction power to punish contempt of court
order).
Generally, a contempt of court is an act or omission that substantially disrupts the
judicial process in a particular case. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 183, 185 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dobbs]; see United States v. Ross, 243 F. Supp.
496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (any act calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct court in ad-
ministration of justice is contempt). Contempt of court may include disruptive behavior dur-
ing trial or the disobedience of judicial orders. Dobbs, supra, at 185-86; see, e.g., In re
DuBoyce, 241 F.2d 855, 855 (3d Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (defendant's argumentative and ar-
rogant manner in open defiance of trial judge was contempt of court); Jones v. United
States, 151 F.2d 289, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (per curiam) (refusal to obey lawful court order is
contempt of court). Congress has specified the situations in which a federal court may issue
a contempt citation and punish the contempt by fine or imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 401
(1976). Section 401 defines contempt of court as misbehavior by a person in the court's
presence that obstructs the administration of justice; misbehavior of any court officers in of-
ficial transactions; or disobedience to the court's lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command issued in a proceeding pending before the court. Id.
' See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) (character
and purpose of punishment ordered by court distinguishes civil from criminal contempt);
United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 626-27 (9th Cir. 1980) (difference between criminal
and civil contempt is intended effect of court-ordered punishment).
' See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947) (civil contempt pro-
ceedings designed either to coerce compliance with court's order or to compensate wronged
party); United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1976) (purpose of civil contempt is
to enforce compliance with court order or to compensate aggrieved party); see 11 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2690 (1973) (courts employ civil contempt
sanctions to coerce compliance with court's order or to compensate aggrieved party).
When a court imposes a fine in a civil contempt order to compensate the aggrieved party,
the violator may pay the fine to the aggrieved party, or to the clerk of the court. See, e.g.,
United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947) (compensation in civil contempt imposes fine
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court order, then courts consider the contempt criminal.' The distinc-
tion between civil and criminal contempt is important because a party
may appeal immediately a criminal contempt citation as a final court
order, while civil contempt orders generally are appealable only once the
primary court action producing the injunction becomes final.' The
courts recognize an exception to the rule that a party may not appeal a
civil contempt order when the party is no longer a party to the primary
court action.29 In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, UMW the Fourth
payable to complainant, but evidence must show that complainant suffered actual loss); In re
Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1980) (coercive nonpunitive fine payable to clerk of
court is appropriate tool in civil contempt case).
Civil contempt is coercive in the sense that the court lifts the sanction immediately
upon the violator's compliance with the court order. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v.
Brewery Workers Local Union No. 77, 555 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1977) (civil contempt
primarily intended to coerce prospective compliance); Douglas v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,
543 F.2d 894, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (penalty is civil when purpose of contempt citation is to
coerce compliance).
I See, e.g., United States v. Hilbum, 625 F.2d 1177, 1179 (5th Cir. 1980) (punishment is
criminal contempt when purpose is to vindicate authority of court by punishing wrongdoer);
Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1980) (punishment is criminal when purpose
is punitive, vindicates court's authority, and does not terminate on compliance with court
order); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 543 F.2d 894, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (penalty for
criminal contempt is solely punitive, to punish for past disobedience). Courts consider a
criminal contempt sanction punitive when the court imposes a fine payable to the state or
when the court imprisons the violator for a fixed term. See Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunc-
tions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 780, 790 (1943) (imprisonment for fixed term or
fines payable to state are punitive criminal contempt sanctions).
One consequence of a criminal contempt order is that the order entitles the violator to
the protection of criminal procedural safeguards. See Dobbs, supra note 24, at 241-43
(criminal contempt order brings almost entire panoply of criminal safeguards into play). The
opposing party has the burden of proving the violator's disobedience beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911) (presumption that
person charged with criminal contempt is innocent unless proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt). A court cannot order the violator to testify against himself. See Parker
v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946); see also In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52 (1943)
(court cannot amend criminal contempt sentence by returning fine paid and imposing new
sentence of imprisonment).
I See Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 517 F.2d 1348, 1349 (4th Cir. 1975). In Carbon Fuel,
the Fourth Circuit emphasized that a civil contempt proceeding is a continuation of the main
action and therefore not appealable immediately, while a criminal contempt proceeding is in-
dependent of the main action and therefore appealable immediately. Id.; see also Fox v.
Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936) (except in connection with appeal from final judgment,
party may not appeal order for civil contempt); Doyle v. London Guar. & Accident Co., 204
U.S. 599, 603 (1907) (contempt order that is not criminal is interlocutory and not reviewable
until appeal from final decree in case); Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir.
1968) (civil contempt order is reviewable only upon appeal taken from final judgment or
decree). The violator may not appeal a criminal contempt adjudication until the court im-
poses a sentence rendering the contempt final. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, at § 2962.
See Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1904) (civil contempt citation
is appealable when person held in contempt is no longer party to underlying claim).
I Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, 683 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1982).
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Circuit reviewed the contempt order the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia issued against a union, its of-
ficers, and its members for failing to comply with a Boys Markets injunc-
tion." In deciding whether the district court properly issued the injunc-
tion, the Fourth Circuit considered the nature of civil contempt fines and
whether Reis is applicable in cases in which a court has fined individual
union members for contempt of court orders.
3
1
The dispute in Consolidation began when the plaintiff Consolidation
Coal Company (Company) suspended a member of Local 1702 for stealing
property from the Company's mine.3 To protest the suspension, the mid-
night shift began a wildcat strike.3 ' The strike continued through all
shifts, causing a work stoppage that lasted five days.3 5 In the district
court, the Company sought to enjoin the union and its members from
continuing the strike.3 6 The district court issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) prohibiting the union, its officers, and its members from con-
tinuing the strike.3 7 When the union members ignored the TRO, the
district court ordered the union and its members to show cause why the
court should not adjudge the defendants in civil contempt of the court's
order. 8 At the show-cause hearing, the district court held the union, its
officials, and its members in civil contempt for willfully violating the
TRO and for failing to use reasonable efforts to end the strike. 9 The dis-
trict court also applied the mass action theory to find Local 1702 in civil
contempt." The mass action theory states that a union, as the recognized
representative of its members, is responsible for the collective actions of
its members, even when the action is not union-authorized.4' As a result
", Id. at 829-30; see supra note 22 (requirements of Boys Markets injunction).
' 683 F.2d at 829-30; see supra text accompanying notes 13-15 (Reis holding).
683 F.2d at 828.
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 12 (wildcat strike is strike not authorized by
union).
" 683 F.2d at 828-29.
"' Id. at 828; see Brief for Appellee at 5, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, 683 F.2d
827 (4th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs motion for TRO) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
' 683 F.2d at 828-29. The district court served notice of the TRO by mailing certified
copies to the union and its members. Id. at 829.
38 Id.
'3 Id. The evidence adduced at the show-cause hearing in Consolidated Coal established
that the union members failed to return to work, that union officials failed to urge the
membership to return to work except at one meeting and between shifts, and that the of-
ficials failed to threaten the membership with disciplinary measures for ignoring the back-
to-work order. Id.
40 Id.
' See United States v. International Union, UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(union that functions in representative capacity must be held responsible for mass action of
its members) affd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949). The premise
underlying the mass action theory is that large groups of men do not act collectively
without leadership and that the union in its representative position is thereby responsible
for the mass action of union members. See Eazor Express Inc. v. International Bhd. of
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of the civil contempt finding, the district court levied fines against the
union, its officials, and its members.42
The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for a TRO on the
theory that the wildcat strike violated the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement between the union and the company. 3 The labor
contract provided that all local disputes between the union and the com-
pany were subject to settlement by grievance and arbitration pro-
cedures.4 The district court noted that the contract bound the defendant
union to submit the dispute that caused the strike in Consolidation to
the arbitration procedures prescribed in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.45 Therefore, the district court ordered the defendants to submit
the dispute to arbitration under the provisions of the contract. 6
In addition to requesting injunctive relief in district court, the Com-
pany brought a separate action requesting monetary damages from the
union and its officers for losses sustained as a result of the work stop-
page." The Company subsequently decided not to pursue the damages
claim against the union officers, and the district court ordered that por-
Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 963 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976), reh'g denied, 425
U.S. 908 (1976). The Eazor court stated that courts upholding union liability under the mass
action theory also may hold the union liable for a failure to use all reasonable means to end
the strike. Id. at 964. A separate theory for union liability is the agency theory. Consolida-
tion Coal Co. v. International Union, UMW, 500 F. Supp. 72, 75 (D. Utah 1980); see infra note
50 (discussion of agency theory).
" 683 F.2d at 829. The Consolidation Coal district court levied fines against the union
assessed as $3,000 per shift and against each union officer, committeeman, and local member
assessed as $25.00 per shift. Id. Pursuant to the defendants' motion to remit the fines and
Consolidation Coal Company's (the Company) motion to reduce the fines to judgment, the
district court reduced the fines against the union and its officers to $500.00 and $10.00 per
shift and entirely eliminated the fines against each member of the union. Brief for Appellee,
supra note 36, at 8-9. The district court reasoned that a partial reduction of the civil con-
tempt fines was proper because the union members returned to work at the next shift after
the contempt order issued. Joint Appendix at 93-94, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702,
683 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix]. The district court cited
the Supreme Court case Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Reis when the court eliminated the
fines against the individual union members. Id. at 94; see Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 417 (1981) (Supreme Court prohibited damages actions against individual
wildcat strikers).
43 683 F.2d at 828; see Joint Appendix, supra note 42, at 36 (strike at plaintiffs mine
was direct violation of collective bargaining agreement). The union and the Company were
parties to a collective bargaining agreement called the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1978. 683 F.2d at 829, Joint Appendix, supra, at 35.
" 683 F.2d at 828.
41 Id. at 829.
41 Joint Appendix, supra note 42, at 37. In addition to requiring the union to submit the
dispute to arbitration, the district court ordered the Company to cooperate with the union
in the peaceful settlement of the dispute through the arbitration procedure. Id.
47 683 F.2d at 829; see Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2907,
2910 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (district court opinion on Consolidation Coal Company's damages
claim).
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tion of the damages action dismissed.48 The district court applied the
common-law rule of agency to hold that the union was not liable in
damages. 9 Under the common-law rule of agency, a union is liable for
damage resulting from a wildcat strike upon a showing that the union
made itself a party to the strike."0
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the union raised four major issues.5
First, the union argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction under
section 301 to issue a TRO against the individual members and officers
of Local 1702.12 The union took the position that the LMRA limited the
scope of section 301 to actions against labor unions and does not
authorize actions against individual union officers or members. 53 Second,
the union contended that the district court violated section 301 by
assessing civil contempt fines against individual officers of Local 1702.51
Under the union's theory, the district court's assessment of fines against
individual union officers engaged in a wildcat strike constituted a
damages award prohibited by the Supreme Court in Reis.5 Third, the
union claimed that the district court erred in relying exclusively on the
mass action theory to find Local 1702 in civil contempt of court." The
union relied upon a Supreme Court decision interpreting section 301 to
limit the responsibility of international unions for local wildcat strikes to
the common-law rule of agency. 7 Fourth, the union argued that the union
8 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 2907.
" Id. at 2908-10.
' United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 598 F.2d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 1979); see supra note
41 (mass action theory is separate theory for determining union liability). To show union in-
volvement under the agency theory, an employer must prove that the agents of the union
participated in, ratified, instigated, encouraged, condoned, or in any manner directed the
unauthorized strike. North River Energy Corp. v. UMW, 664 F.2d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir.
1981). The acts of the union agents must be within the scope of the agents' authority and on
behalf of the union. Central Appalachian Coal Co. v. UMW, 376 F. Supp. 914, 923 (S.D. W.
Va. 1974). An agent's acts within the scope of his authority bind the union, regardless of
whether the union specifically authorized or ratified the acts. Vulcan Materials Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446, 457 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971).
683 F.2d at 829-31.
683 F.2d at 829; see supra note 6 (discussion of § 301 of LMRA).
Brief for Appellant at 10, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, 683 F.2d 827 (4th Cir.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]; see 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) (courts may not
enforce money judgments against individual union member).
' 683 F.2d at 829; see supra note 6 (§ 301 discussion).
' Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 6 (construing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981)); see supra note 14 (discussion of Reis).
' 683 F.2d at 831; see supra note 41 (discussion of mass action theory).
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 6 (construing Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444
U.S. 212 (1979)). In Carbon Fuel, the Supreme Court rejected the theory of union liability
suggesting that a union is liable under a no-strike clause for failing to use all reasonable
means to end an unauthorized strike. Id. at 215; see supra note 41 (union liable for failure to
use best efforts to end wildcat strikes); supra note 50 (discussion of agency theory).
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officials' good faith efforts to comply with the district court's back to
work order established a defense to the civil contempt charge. 58
The Company urged the dismissal of the union's appeal, contending
that the civil contempt order was not appealable until the Company's
breach of contract suit became final. 9 The Company also contended that
the district court's civil contempt order was proper because the union of-
ficials failed to take reasonable steps to end the strike or, alternatively,
because the union was liable under the mass action theory." In response
to the union's argument that the district court did not have the jurisdic-
tion to issue the TRO, the Company's position was that section 301 did
not limit the district court's power to issue injunctive relief."' Because
the district court had jurisdiction to issue the TRO, the Company claimed
that the district court also had the power to hold the defendants in civil
contempt of court.2 Finally, the Company asserted that the district
1 683 F.2d at 832. The officers of Local 1702 took the position that they made good
faith efforts to comply with the district court's back-to-work order by calling a special
meeting during which the officers directed the union members to go back to work, and by
appearing at the beginning of each work shift to urge the members to return to work. Id.
The union officers argued that they were unable to comply fully with the court's order
because of the pressures involved in negotiating with company management in the arbitra-
tion hearing over the strike dispute. Id. The courts have recognized the substantial com-
pliance and good faith defenses. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. International Union, UMW,
537 F.2d 1226, 1232 (4th Cir. 1976) (mine workers good faith efforts at compliance made judg-
ment of civil contempt inappropriate); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. v.
Amalgamated Transit Union, 531 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (either substantial com-
pliance or inability to comply is defense in coercive court proceedings arising out of labor
disputes).
59 683 F.2d at 830; see supra note 28 (civil contempt citations generally not appealable
until final judgment in main action).
' Brief for Appellee, supra note 36, at 12-27. The Company argued that the district
court's evidence clearly adduced that the officers failed to use available means in a genuine
effort to end the strike. Id. at 13; see supra note 39 (district court findings that the union
and union officers failed to take reasonable measures to end strike). The Company also
argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel to uphold the agency theory of
union liability applied only to international unions and not local unions. Brief for Appellee,
supra note 36, at 22-23; see supra note 57 (discussion of Carbon Fuel). Therefore, the plain-
tiff asserted that the mass action theory remained viable against local unions whose
members engaged in an illegal strike. Brief for Appellee, supra note 36, at 26.
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 28 (construing Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks
Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1969)); see supra note 19 (discussion of Boys Markets). Con-
solidation Coal Company contended that the district court properly issued a Boys Markets
injunction because the labor dispute was over the arbitrable issue of suspension of
employees. Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 29; see text accompanying note 22 (Boys
Market requirement that labor dispute be arbitrable under the collective bargaining agree-
ment).
' Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 29 (construing Windsor Power House Coal Co.
v. District 6, UMW, 530 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 876 (1977)). In Wind-
sor, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of a civil contempt citation pur-
suant to the union's failure to obey a Boys Markets injunction. 530 F.2d at 315-17.
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court, in assessing fines against the union and its officials, was following
a standard procedure used to coerce compliance with court orders."3
Addressing the union's jurisdictional argument, the Fourth Circuit
held that the Boys Markets decision authorized the district court's is-
suance of the TRO against the local union officials for violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 4 The Fourth Circuit rejected the union's
argument that the Reis decision precluded the district court's assess-
ment of fines for civil contempt of court. The Consolidation court held
that a fine for civil contempt is not a damages action within the scope of
the Reis analysis but rather serves to coerce compliance with court
orders.6 The Fourth Circuit noted that the district court's power to
issue injunctive relief must include the power to fine individuals who
disobey a court order.
The Consolidation court next considered the Company's argument
that the Fourth Circuit should dismiss the union's appeal because the
district court's contempt order was civil and therefore not appealable
until final resolution of the Company's underlying contract claim. To
determine whether the contempt order was civil or criminal in nature,
the Fourth Circuit applied the two-part test established in Windsor
Power House Coal Co. v. District 6, UMW. 9 The first prong of the Wind-
sor test examines whether the contempt order is forward looking so that
I Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 29 (construing Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 517
F.2d 1348, 1349 (4th Cir. 1976)). In Carbon Fuel, the Fourth Circuit distinguished civil con-
tempt from criminal contempt by noting that the purpose of civil contempt is to coerce com-
pliance with an order of the court. 517 F.2d at 1349; see supra note 26 (civil contempt tradi-
tionally served to coerce compliance with court orders).
11 683 F.2d at 829 (construing Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerk Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970)); see supra text accompanying notes 19-23 (Supreme Court held injunctive relief per-
missible under § 301).
1 683 F.2d at 829-30. In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit stated that the Reis
decision is not authority for the proposition that a court cannot fine individuals for violation
of a back-to-work order. Id. at 830; see supra text accompanying notes 13-15 (Reis decision).
1 683 F.2d at 829. In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit stated that a fine for civil
contempt is a means to enforce a court order of injunctive relief and is not an action for
damages. Id. Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that civil contempt fines may serve
to compensate the aggrieved party, the court emphasized that the fines primarily serve to
coerce behavior. Id.; see supra note 26 (civil contempt proceedings traditionally serve to
compensate wronged party and to coerce compliance with court order).
' 683 F.2d at 829-30. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that to deny a court the power to
fine individuals for disobeying an injunction would deprive the court of an effective means
to enforce the injunction. Id.
Id. at 830-31.
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 28 (contempt orders not appealable until final
judgment of underlying claim); see also Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6, UMW,
530 F.2d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 876 (1977). In Windsor, the Fourth
Circuit considered the appealability of a district court contempt order against a union for
failing to obey a TRO. 530 F.2d at 316-17. The Fourth Circuit's analysis focused on the deter-
mination of whether the contempt order was civil or criminal. Id.
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the sanction terminates when the party complies with the court order."0
The second prong of the test requires the court to determine whether
the order compensates the injured party for losses sustained as a result
of the contempt." The Fourth Circuit held that for the most part the con-
tempt order operated prospectively on a per-shift-missed basis and that
the fines were compensatory to offset the Company's losses resulting
from the strike. 2 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that Local
1702, its officers, and its members were guilty of civil contempt. 3
The Fourth Circuit next considered the appealability of the civil con-
tempt order." At the outset, the Fourth Circuit recognized the tradi-
tional rule that a civil contempt order is unappealable until a court
makes a final judgment on the underlying claim.' The Consolidation
court also noted an exception to the traditional rule that applies when a
person held in contempt is no longer a party to the underlying claim., Ap-
plying the exception in Consolidation, the Fourth Circuit held that the
district court's dismissal of the Company's damages claim against the
union officers effectively precluded any other opportunity the officers
might have for review of their contempt convictions. 7 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the civil conitempt citation was
appealable.
78
Finally, the Consolidation court addressed the union's argument that
the district court had erroneously relied on the mass action theory to
hold the union in civil contempt of court.79 The Fourth Circuit considered
70 530 F.2d at 316.
' Id. The Windsor court relied on the traditional definition of civil contempt expressed
in Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW. Id.; see Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 517 F.2d 1348, 1349 (4th Cir.
1975). In Carbon Fuel, the Fourth Circuit viewed civil contempt as a process to coerce com-
pliance with an order of the court that terminates once the violator obeys the court order.
Id. at 1349-50. Civil contempt also may compensate the injured party for losses sustained as
a result of the party's noncompliance. Id.; see supra note 26 (traditional definition of civil
contempt).
, 683 F.2d at 830-31. The Fourth Circuit held that a portion of the contempt order
assessed fines effective immediately upon issuance of the order. Id. at 830. Therefore, that
part of the contempt order was not forward looking because the court fined the union
without allowing the union the opportunity to purge itself of the contempt by returning to
work. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that the essential purpose of the contempt
order was to coerce compliance. Id.
73 Id.
' Id. at 830-31.
7 Id.; see supra note 28 (traditional rule that civil contempt order is not immediately
appealable).
" 683 F.2d at 831 (construing Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir.
1968)) (person made party to underlying claims may appeal civil contempt citation immediately);
see supra note 29 (person held in civil contempt of court may appeal contempt citation im-
mediately if person is no longer party to underlying claim).
' 683 F.2d at 831.
8 .Id.
" Id.; see supra note 41 (mass action theory).
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it unnecessary to decide whether the Supreme Court's decision to limit
an international union's liability to the rule of agency also applied to
local union actions.0 The Consolidation court held instead that the
district court properly found the union in contempt because the union of-
ficials failed to take reasonable steps to end the strike." The Fourth Cir-
cuit also held that the union officers' failure to use reasonable efforts to
end the wildcat strike precluded a determination that the officials had
established a good faith defense to the civil contempt order."
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the district court properly
issued a Boys Markets injunction against wildcat strikers extends the
scope of the Boys Markets decision. 3 The Boys Markets Court, in
holding that courts may enjoin strikes based on arbitrable grievances,
did not reach the question of whether injunctive relief will lie against
the individual officers and members of unions engaged in wildcat
strikes.84 In Reis, the Supreme Court specifically declined to decide the
issue. 5 The Consolidation court's approval of the application of the Boys
Markets injunction to the wildcat strikers settles, in the Fourth Circuit,
the question left open in Boys Markets and Reis and is consistent with a
number of other courts.86
1 683 F.2d at 831-32 n.6; see text accompanying note 57 (Supreme Court limited inter-
national union's liability for breach of no-strike clause to agency rule). The Fourth Circuit
noted that the Carbon Fuel court addressed the issue of the liability of international unions
as opposed to local unions. 683 F.2d at 832 n.6.
"' 683 F.2d at 831. The Fourth Circuit ruled that union officials failed to take adequate
measures to induce the strikers to return to work. Id. The officials neither returned to work
nor issued an official union return-to-work order. Id. Nor did the officers threaten or take
disciplinary action against the wildcat strikers. Id.
82 Id. at 832; see supra note 58 (court recognition of good faith defense).
See 683 F.2d at 829 (Fourth Circuit upheld district court's issuance of Boys Markets
injunction); supra text accompanying notes 19-23 (Boys Markets decision).
" See 398 U.S. 235, 239 (1970) (Boys Markets Court addressed issue of injunctive relief
against union).
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 416-17 n.18 (1981). The Reis
Court stated that the issue of whether the district court could have issued a Boys Markets
injunction was not before the court. Id. The Reis Court speculated, however, that the
district court might not issue an injunction in the case because the strike commenced over a
nonarbitrable labor dispute. Id.
" See Stein Printing Co. v. Atlanta Typographical Union, 329 F. Supp. 754, 757-58
(N.D. Ga. 1971). In Stein, employees of the plaintiff company engaged in a work stoppage
because their foreman was not a union member. Id. at 756. The state court enjoined the
union and its members from continuing the strike. Id. at 757. The district court affirmed the
injunction against the union members as proper under the Boys Markets rationale because
the dispute was arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement between the
employer and the union. Id. at 757-58; see Hilton Int'l Co. v. Asociacion de Empleados de
Casino de Puerto Rico, 324 F. Supp. 492, 494 (D.P.R. 1971). In Hilton, employees of the plain-
tiff corporation refused to work because of a salary dispute with the corporation. Id. at 493.
The district court found that the union, its agents, and its members engaged in a strike in
violation of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 494. Asserting
that Boys Markets controlled the case, the Hilton district court issued an injunction against
the union and its members. Id.
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In United States v. Cunningham,87 the Sixth Circuit held that the
district court properly issued a TRO against individual union members
engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage in response to the plaintiff
corporation's discharge of union officers.8 The Sixth Circuit ruled that a
Boys Markets injunction was appropriate because the labor dispute was
arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement. 9 Similarly, in Na-
tional Rejectors Industries v. United Steelworkers," the Eighth Circuit
upheld a Boys Markets injunction against union employees engaged in
work slowdowns over the enforcement of company work rules.91 As in
Cunningham, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that injunctive relief
against union members is proper when the underlying dispute is arbi-
trable.92 Thus, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits' decisions support the
Fourth Circuit's decision to permit injunctive relief in Consolidation
because of the arbitrability of the underlying dispute. 3
The Fourth Circuit's decision that the district court properly assessed
fines against individual union members is consistent with the policies
underlying injunctive relief under section 301.1' The Supreme Court has
held that enforcement of injunctive relief is proper under section 301 to
promote the arbitration process and to ensure the effectiveness of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 95 To enforce injunctive relief, courts can
87 599 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 122. In Cunningham, employees of the plaintiff corporation engaged in a work
stoppage over the corporation's discharge of six union officials. Id. at 122. The district court
issued a TRO against the union members because the cause of the strike was an arbitrable
issue. Id. at.127.
11 Id. at 126-27. The Sixth Circuit held that the strike arose out of a labor dispute sub-
ject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the labor contract and therefore violated
the contract's no-strike clause. Id. at 127.
562 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
11 Id. at 1074. In National Rejectors, the dispute arose over employee discharges for
violating company work rules. Id. at 1073. The district court noted that, by violating the
work rules, the union employees engaged in activity calculated to slow up production at the
company's plant. Id. The district court held that the employee activity violated the no-strike
clause in the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, issued an injunction against
the union and its officials. Id. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's is-
suance of the injunction, reasoning that the Supreme Court's decision in Boys Markets
authorized injunctive relief despite the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Id. at 1374; see supra note 2 (Norris-LaGuardia Act).
Id. at 1075. In NationalRejectors the Eighth Circuit emphasized that a Boys Markets
injunction is appropriate only when injunctive relief is necessary to compel specific perform-
ance of the arbitration provisions of the labor contract. Id. at 1075.
91 See 683 F.2d at 828-29 (district court held labor dispute subject to arbitration provis-
ions of collective bargaining agreement); supra text accompanying note 64 (Fourth Circuit
upheld district court's issuance of injunctive relief) and 87-90 (Sixth and Eighth Circuits'
decisions).
" See 683 F.2d at 829-30 (Fourth Circuit upheld civil contempt fines); supra note 15
(legislative history of § 301).
" See Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 252-53 (1970) (injunction en-
forced obligation that union freely undertook under collective bargaining agreement to sub-
mit disputes to arbitration).
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specifically design contempt fines to achieve worker compliance." The
concurrence in Reis recognized that courts have the power under section
301 to impose contempt penalties on individual workers when the
workers refuse to comply with an injunction."
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the Reis decision did not
preclude the fines assessed in Consolidation is consistent with section 301
policy.98 In Reis, the Supreme Court stressed that section 301's
legislative history demonstrated a congressional intent to allow a
damages remedy against unions but not against individual union
members for a breach of collective bargaining agreements.99 The Court's
decision in Reis, however, did not conclusively establish that section 301
bars the imposition of money judgments against individual union mem-
bers."' Congressional concern in drafting section 301 focused on the
prevention of a recurrence of the Danbury Hatters situation.'' In Dan-
bury Hatters, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's issuance
of a large money judgment against individual union members for partici-
pating in a union boycott of the plaintiff employer's goods."' The Court
affirmed the lower court's order attaching many of the union members'
" See Note, Labor Law-Strike-Individual Union Members Not Liable for Breach
of Contractual No-Strike Clause Even When Strike Unauthorized by Union, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 447, 454 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Strike]. The author noted that the Boys Markets
injunctive remedy against wildcat strikers is consistent with the labor policy promoting
peaceful resolution of disputes through compliance with collective bargaining agreements.
Id. 454-55; see supra note 2 (labor policy). In the analysis of judicial enforcement of injunc-
tions, the author asserted that court fines often are more reasonable in amount than
damages for employee's losses. Strike, supra, at 454-55. In addition, courts could design the
contempt fines to coerce worker compliance. Id. A court could coerce compliance with the
injunction by issuing a conditional decree that imposes a fine for each strike day, but allows
the strikers to avoid the liability by returning to work. Id. at 455 n.42.
' Strike, supra note 96, at 450; see Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401,
420 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (contempt penalties imposed on individual workers are dif-
ficult to enforce).
" See 683 F.2d at 829-30 (Fourth Circuit decision that Reis does not bar district court
issuance of fines); supra note 15 (legislative history of § 301).
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 406-18 (1981) (Reis court
analysis of § 301); supra note 15 (Reis discussion of § 301's legislative history).
" See Note, Unleashing the Wildcats: The Supreme Court Immunizes Wildcat
Strikes from Individual Damage Liability for Employer Losses Resulting from the Wildcat
Strike, 59 DENVER L.J. 577, 584 (1982). In analyzing the Reis decision, the commentator con-
cluded that the Reis court could have decided that individual union members were liable for
money judgments under § 301 and remained consistent with botl congressional intent and
judicial precedent. Id.
.., See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248 (1962) (legislative history of
§ 301 reveals that section was congressional reaction against Danbury Hatters case); supra
note 15 (§ 301 legislative history).
"' Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 536-37 (1915). In the first Supreme Court decision on
the Danbury Hatters case, the Court held that the union's boycott of the goods produced by
the plaintiffs hat manufacturing business was a restraint of trade in violation of the Anti-
trust Act of 1891. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 285-92 (1908).
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homes to satisfy the judgment."' Significant factual differences exist,
however, between situations like Danbury Hatters involving union-
authorized action and Reis-type cases that involve independent unautho-
rized action." 4 Moreover, the language of section 301 does not state that
employers have no recourse against union members for individually
breaching the collective bargaining agreement."5
The Fourth Circuit's determination that the union was guilty of civil
contempt for failing to use reasonable steps to end the wildcat strike is
consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent."6 In United Steel Corp. v.
UMW,10 1 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that a local
union and its officers were guilty of civil contempt for failing to take
reasonable steps to end a wildcat strike."'8 In upholding the contempt
order, the Fifth Circuit, like the Consolidation court, noted especially
the union officers' failure to return to work, to reach the workers by
phone, or to take disciplinary action against the wildcat strikers. 9
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the contempt order in Consoli-
dation was civil under the two-part test developed in Windsor is consist-
103 Loewe v. Savings Bank, 242 U.S. 357, 358 (1917). The district court could not impose
a money judgment against the union because at that time unions could not be sued as en-
tities. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 422 (initial obstacle in enforcing collective
bargaining agreement was impossibility of suing labor unions as entities). Congress pre-
vented a repetition of Danbury Hatters by providing in § 301 that unions may be sued as
legal entitles. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) (labor organization may sue or be sued as entity).
104 See Note, Labor Relations -No-Strike Provision, 6 GA. L. REV. 797, 801 n.24 (1972)
(Danbury Hatters involved individual liability for collective action and not individual liability
for individual action); Note, An Employer's Recourse to Wildcat Strikes Includes Fashion-
ing His Own Remedy: Section 301 Does Not Sanction an Individual Damage Suit, 57 NOTRE
DAME L. 598, 606 (1982) (factual difference between union-authorized action in Danbury Hat-
ters and individual unauthorized action in Reis) [hereinafter cited as Remedy]; Note, Labor
Law-Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1657,
1664-65 (1972) (legislative history of § 301 supports conclusion that Congress intended to
prohibit union membership liability only when union is responsible for breach of labor con-
tract) [hereinafter cited as Labor Law].
XIS See Labor Law, supra note 104, at 1664 (nothing in section 301 expressly prohibits
damage suits against individuals); see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401,
424-27 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In the Reis dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by
Justice Rehnquist, asserted that the majority placed too much emphasis on § 301(b) of the
LMRA. Id. at 426 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976) (money judgments
are enforceable against labor organizations only and not against individual members or
their assets). The dissent acknowledged that Congress enacted the provision to prevent a
recurrence of the Danbury Hatters situation. 451 U.S. at 426 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see
supra text accompanying notes 101-03 (Danbury Hatters case). The Reis dissent maintained,
however, that § 301(b) only insulated union members from personal liability for union
breaches of the contract. 451 U.S. at 426 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"II See 683 F.2d at 831 (Fourth Circuit held that union failed to use reasonable steps to
end strike); see also note 81 (evidence that officers failed to use reasonable efforts); infra
text accompanying notes 107-09 (Fifth Circuit precedent).
107 598 F.2d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 367-68.
1 Id. at 368.
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ent with Fourth Circuit precedent. " ' In Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW,"' the
Fourth Circuit determined that a contempt order is civil when the con-
tempt sanction intends to coerce prospective compliance with a court
order and when the contempt sanction compensates the aggrieved party
for losses caused by the opposing party's noncompliance. "2 The Consoli-
dation decision also is consistent with Supreme Court precedent which
holds that civil contempt coerces a party into complying with a court
order or compensates the wronged party for losses sustained."3 In per-
mitting an immediate appeal of the civil contempt citation, the Fourth
Circuit is consistent with the Fifth Circuit."' In Southern Railroad Co. v.
Lanham,"5 the Fifth Circuit recognized that a civil contempt order is
final and appealable when a person held in contempt is not a party to the
underlying claim."' The Fourth Circuit's Consolidation decision also is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent which holds a civil contempt
order appealable when a person is no longer a party to the underlying
claim."7
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Consolidation is most significant for
the court's refusal to extend the Reis holding to the district court's im-
position of civil contempt fines against wildcat strikers."' Because Reis
prohibited employers' damages actions against union members engaged
in unauthorized strikes, employers were left with few effective mea-
sures to combat such strikes." 9 The Fourth Circuit's decision upholds the
use of the injunction as employers' most expeditious method of enforcing
the unions' no-strike obligations under collective bargaining
agreements.2 '
ELIZABETH A. RYAN
"' See 683 F.2d at 830-31 (Fourth Circuit determined contempt order was civil); see
also Windsor Power House Coal Co. v. District 6, UMW, 530 F.2d 312, 316 (4th Cir.) (Wind-
sor two-part test), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 876 (1976).
.' 517 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1349.
"' See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947) (civil contempt proceedings
either coerce compliance with court's order or compensate aggrieved party).
",4 See 683 F.2d at 830-31 (Fourth Circuit allowed immediate appeal of civil contempt
citation); infra text accompanying notes 115-17 (Fifth Circuit precedent).
403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 125.
See Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1904) (person no longer party
to underlying claim immediately may appeal civil contempt order).
... See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 417 (1981) (Reis Court
holding).
".. See Remedy, supra note 104, at 610 (employer has few effective remedies for respond-
ing to wildcat strike); see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 419-20
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring). The concurrence noted that an employer realistically has few
effective alternatives to a damages action against wildcat strikers. Id. (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
" See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1970) (injunc-
tion is effective weapon for combatting wildcat strikes).
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C. Union Interference with Representation Elections
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act1 (NLRA or the Act)
permits employees to form labor organizations for collective bargaining
purposes.2 Employees3 voice their preferences for self-organization at
representation elections4 conducted by the National Labor Relations
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congress passed the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA or the Act) in 1935. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); see B. SCHWARTZ & R.
KORETZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION 260-47 (1970)
(discussion of development of NLRA). The Act's purpose is to promote stability in the
economy by providing a fair and equitable method of establishing representation for collec-
tive bargaining purposes. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (policies of Act); see also NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-03 (1952) (NLRA designed to promote industrial
peace); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938) (NLRA promotes forma-
tion of contracts between employees and unions for collective bargaining purposes). The
Act, therefore, establishes employees' right to organize and bargain collectively. See 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976 & Supp. mI 1979) (rights of employees under Act); accord NLRB v. Penn-
sylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1938). The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In
Jones the Supreme Court held that congressional power to regulate commerce and enact all
necessary and proper legislation for the protection of commerce included the authority to
protect and insure employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively. 301 U.S. at 43; see
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cls. 3, 18.
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 7 of the NLRA, as amended by
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), permits employees to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing. Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 7, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976 & Supp. I1 1979)). Section 7 of the NLRA, however, did not establish employees' right
to self-organization. Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261,
263 (1940); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937)
(employees' right to self-organization is fundamental).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979). The term "employees" under the NLRA
applies to all employees except supervisors, agricultural laborers, domestic servants
employed at a person's residence, workers employed by his parent or spouse, independent
contractors, or workers employed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). In addition, managerial employees are not
employees under the Act. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974); see also
Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947) (managerial employees
defined as employees who implement managerial policies into work place).
See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976) (representatives and elections). Representation elections
consist of the process by which employees express their preferences for or against union
representation for collective bargaining purposes. NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324,
330-31 (1946); Zeiglers Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000, 1004 (3d Cir. 1981).
For a comprehensive discussion of campaign regulation, see R. WILLIAMS, D. JANUS & K.
HUAN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (Labor Relations and Public Policy Series,
Report No. 8, 1974). See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representa-
tion Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 38-42 (1964)
(analysis and recommendations for reform of NLRA representation elections); Samoff,
NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 228 (1968) (functional
aspects of NLRB elections).
Section 9(c)(1) of the NLRA permits employers, unions, or employees to file a petition
for a representation election whenever a question concerning representation of employees
exists. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board)
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Board 5 (NLRB or the Board). Any interference by employer,' union,'
receives all representation election petitions. Id.; see infra note 5 (NLRB's function and pur-
pose in representation election process). The NLRB, after receiving an election representa-
tion petition, investigates the underlying facts and conducts a hearing, if necessary, to
determine whether the Board has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representa-
tion "affecting commerce" exists. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976); see id. § 152(7) (definition of "af-
fecting commerce"). If the NLRB concludes that a representation "affecting commerce" ex-
ists, the Board will direct a secret ballot election and certify the results of that election. Id.
§ 159(c)(1).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976) (National Labor Relations Board). Section 3 of the NLRA
authorizes creation of the NLRB. Id. § 153(a). The Board consists of five members appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Id. Board members serve five year terms. Id.
The NLRB's responsibilities include establishing and policing reasonable and proper stand-
ards for the conduct of representation elections. Collins & Aikman Corp. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d
722, 729 (4th Cir. 1967). The Board normally delegates the initial tasks of investigating and
conducting representation proceedings to the regional director of the region where the pro-
ceeding is pending. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (1981); see also id. 102.67(a) (regional directors rule
on objections to representation elections); id. 102.77(a) (regional directors investigate
representation petitions). The Board, however, maintains power of review over the decisions
of the various regional directors. Id. § 101.19(6)(b).
The Board possesses the power to set aside a representation election and direct
another election. NLRB v. Urban Tel. Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1974); Sewell Mfg.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-70 (1962). In addition to the power to set aside an election, Congress
entrusted the NLRB with the power to determine the steps necessary to conduct a fair elec-
tion. NLRB v. P.A.F. Equip. Co., 528 F.2d 286, 287 (10th Cir. 1976). The Board, therefore,
possesses broad discretion in conducting and supervising representation elections. Coronet-
Western v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 31, 32 (9th Cir. 1975); see also LaCrescent Constant Care
Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 1319, 1321 (8th Cir. 1975) (Board possesses wide discretion in
representation election questions); NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 224 F.2d 649,
651 (4th Cir.) (Congress entrusted control of representation elections to Board), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 914 (1955). NLRB orders are subject to review by the federal courts of appeals. Col-
lins & Aikman Corp. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 722, 726 (4th Cir. 1967). On appeal, NLRB's factual
findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976); accord Collins & Aikman Corp. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 722, 727
(4th Cir. 1967). See generally Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign
Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 38,
82-92 (1964); Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regula-
tion of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263
(1976); Samoff, supra note 4, at 234-38.
' See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 410 (1964) (conferring benefits on
employees during representation election for sole purpose of inducing employees to vote
against union constitutes grounds for setting aside representation election); NLRB v. Ar-
row Elastic Corp., 573 F.2d 702, 704-06 (1st Cir. 1978) (employer's promise of pension
benefits prior to election held sufficient to set aside representation election); Caron Int'l
Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1120-21 (1979) (employer's single threat to dismiss employee if union
prevailed in representation election held insufficient to overturn election); Model Dye
Southern, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 589, 589 (1979) (election upheld where employer had provided
employees with free soda pop five days before election); Smith Int'l, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 20,
20-21 (1979) (election set aside where employer on election day conducted raffle awarding all
expense paid trip).
See NLRB v. Johnson & Hardin Co., 554 F.2d 275, 276 (6th Cir. 1977) (union's confus-
ing instructions to employees concerning waiver of initiation fees held sufficient to set aside
representation election); NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, Inc., 356 F.2d 675, 678-79 (4th
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union agent,8 or third-person9 with employees' right to self-organization
can constitute grounds for setting aside a representation election." In
Cir. 1966) (representation election set aside on account of racial propaganda disseminated by
union); Fontaine Truck Equip. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 1069, 1070 (1979) (election set aside where
union misrepresented employer's profits in pamphlet distributed shortly before election);
United Packinghouse, 153 N.L.R.B. 956, 957-58 (1965) (physical assaults on employees by
union representatives during organizational campaign held sufficient to overturn represen-
tation election).
' See NLRB v. Advanced Syss., Inc., 681 F.2d 570, 575-77 (9th Cir. 1982) (threats and
vandalism conducted by union agents against company employees held sufficient to deny en-
forcement of NLRB bargaining order and to remand case for an evidentiary hearing); NLRB
v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1240-45 (4th cir. 1976) (representation election
set aside where union agents had threatened company employees); NLRB v. Urban Tel.
Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1974) (election set aside on account of union agent's
threats against company employees).
Section 2(13) of the NLRA provides that prior authorization or subsequent ratification
of the acts of another are not controlling in establishing a principal-agent relationship under
the Act. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, § 2(13), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 139 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1976)). Prior to the enactment of § 2(13) of the NLRA,
unions received immunity from liability for the unlawful acts of union officers, members,
and agents, unless clear proof of actual participation in or authorization of such acts existed.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 6, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70, 71 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
115 (1976)); accord United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395,
406-07 (1947) (union is liable only for acts which it expressly or impliedly authorized). Con-
gress enacted § 2(13) of the NLRA to counteract the broad immunity accorded labor
organizations by § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Section 2(13) of the NLRA restored the
common-law principle of apparent authority to labor proceedings. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3b, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1142. Implied or ap-
parent authority, therefore, is sufficient to establish an agency relationship under the
NLRA. See Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 366-67 (10th Cir. 1982) (election in-
terference not attributable to union since pro-union employee did not possess apparent
authority to act on union's behalf); NLRB V. Advanced Syss., Inc., 681 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir.
1982) (evidence supported in-plant organizing committee member's apparent authority to
act on behalf of union); NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1242-45 (4th Cir.
1976) (union accountable for acts of in-plant organizing committee pursuant to principle of
apparent authority); see also infra note 38 (definition of apparent authority). See generally
Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Union, 49 Ky. L.J. 295, 300-37 (1961) (applica-
tion of agency law within NLRA).
' See Methodist Home v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173, 1183 (4th Cir. 1979). In Methodist
Home the Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of an NLRB order and remanded the case for
a full evidentiary hearing on allegations that the union and its agents engaged in coercive
conduct which fatally tainted a representation election. Id. at 1184-85. The coercive conduct
complained of in Methodist Home consisted of a pro-union employee assaulting a pro-
company employee on the eve of a representation election. Id. at 1179. The court, in ad-
dressing the merits of Methodist Home's claim that the NLRB improperly denied the peti-
tioner an evidentiary hearing, noted that third-party conduct which creates a general en-
vironment of fear, rendering free choice of representation impossible, requires setting aside
a representation election. Id. at 1183; see Sonoco of P.R., Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 493, 494 (1974)
(threats of physical harm by pro-union employees against procompany employees justified
overturning election); Steak House Meat Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 28, 29 (1973) (third-party conduct
which renders free choice of representation impossible requires voiding election); see also
infra notes 12 & 13 (laboratory condition standard for representation elections).
10 See infra notes 12 & 13 (laboratory conditions standard).
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their review of representation elections, courts and the Board however
accord less weight to misconduct of third persons than to misconduct of
the employer, the union, or union agents.11 Regardless of the source of
election interference, courts and the Board judge misconduct against a
"laboratory like" environment to determine whether the alleged election
interference had an impact on employees' choice of a bargaining
representative. 2 Under the laboratory conditions standard, an election
is set aside whenever election interference creates an atmosphere
among voting employees of fear or confusion which renders employees'
"1 See Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 1981) (less weight ac-
corded to third-person misconduct than to party misconduct); Orleans Mfg. Co., 120
N.L.R.B. 630, 633 (1958) (Board accords less weight to conduct of third persons than to con-
duct of parties). Courts have advanced several reasons for distinguishing between party and
third-person election misconduct. NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d 1086, 1088 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1038 (1970). Generalli, employees regard threats from non-
authoritative sources more lightly than threats backed up by either a union or an employer.
Id. at 1088. Employees also regard threats from a union or an employer more seriously than
threats from third persons since the employer controls, and the union seeks to control, the
conditions of employment. Id. Moreover, since the union and the company incur the expense
of repeat elections, subjecting them to repeat elections on account of misconduct of parties
over whom the company or union have no control is inequitable and does not deter third
persons from interfering with elections. Id.; see also NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563 F.2d
409, 412 (9th Cir. 1977) (according less weight to third-person misconduct credits employees
with ability to give true weight to allegations of fellow employees); NLRB v. Sauk Valley
Mfg. Co., 486 F.2d 1127, 1131 n.5 (9th Cir. 1973) (according less weight to third-person
misconduct promotes efficient elections since unions and employers, as a practical matter,
cannot control conduct of third persons). But see Zeiglers Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB,
639 F.2d 1000, 1006-07 (3rd Cir. 1981) (third-person threats are not necessarily less frighten-
ing); Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346, 1348 (1st Cir. 1971) (employees perceive fear
from anonymous threats no less effective than fear from union or employer threats).
12 See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). The NLRB first enumerated the
laboratory condition standard for reviewing representation election conduct in General
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). In General Shoe, the Board did not consider company
campaign tactics on the eve of a representation election as unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the amended Act. Id. at 127; 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (unfair labor practices). The
Board, however, did conclude that the company tactics created an atmosphere calculated to
prevent a free and uninhibited choice of bargaining representative by the employees. 77
N.L.R.B. at 127. The Board, therefore, set the election aside. Id. The Board in General Shoe
noted that the NLRB's function in election proceedings is to provide a laboratory environ-
ment, suitable for conducting experiments, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, in
which employees may express their choice of representative free from coercion. Id. at
126. Consequently, conduct which renders the free and unhampered choice of represen-
tative improbable, regardless of whether that misconduct amounts to an unfair labor prac-
tice, constitutes grounds for setting aside a representation election. Id.; see also NLRB v.
A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946) (employees' free choice dispositive in review of
representative election misconduct); Mississippi Valley Structural Steel Co., 196 N.L.R.B.
1129, 1132 (1972) (conduct which constitutes unfair labor practice under § 8 but does not in-
terfere with employees' free choice is insufficient grounds for setting aside representation
election); Hy Plains Dressed Beef, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1257 (1964) (laboratory condition
standard determinative even when misconduct constituted unfair labor practice). But see
Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962) (conduct violative of § 8(a)(1) is con-
duct violative of laboratory conditions standard).
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free choice of bargaining representative impossible.13 In PPG Industries,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,4 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed the issue of union accountability for election in-
terference by organizing committees composed of pro-union employees.
The controversy in PPG arose out of threats of violence which
preceded a union representation election. 5 The union 6 prevailed in the
election by a vote of 678 to 639." PPG, the employer, filed objections to
the election results with the NLRB's regional director."8 The regional
director, however, dismissed PPG's objections to the election pro-
ceedings and certified the union as the employees' bargaining represen-
tative. 9 PPG then petitioned the NLRB to review the regional director's
decision." The Board granted PPG's request for review and remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing on three 1 of PPG's objections.2
During the evidentiary hearing,' company witnesses testified that
"3 See Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1982) (threats of
harm and illegal electioneering did not constitute grounds for setting aside election under
laboratory conditions standard); NLRB v. Advanced Syss., Inc., 681 F.2d 570, 576 (9th Cir.
1982) (threats of bodily harm and property damage constitute grounds for setting aside
representation election under laboratory conditions standard); Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB,
649 F.2d 589, 591-94 (8th Cir. 1981) (pro-union committee threats of bodily harm, property
damage, and disparate economic treatment held insufficient to warrant overturning election
under laboratory conditions standard); Zeiglers Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000,
1006-08 (3d Cir. 1981) (threats of bodily harm directed at company employees by pro-union
employee constituted destruction of laboratory conditions); Methodist Home v. NLRB, 596
F.2d 1173, 1178 (4th Cir. 1979) (assault of pro-company employee by pro-union employee con-
stitutes grounds for setting aside election under laboratory conditions standard); Abbott
Laboratories v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 662, 667 (4th Cir. 1976) (threats of physical violence were not
destructive of laboratory conditions); Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 45-6 (4th Cir.
1968) (union misrepresentation on handbill was not destructive of laboratory conditions),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969); Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 1135, 1137 (1981)
(threats of bodily harm and job loss held insufficient to set election aside under laboratory
conditions standard); Sonoco of P.R., Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 493, 494 (1974) (threats of bodily
harm and property damage warrant overturning election under laboratory conditions stand-
ard).
14 671 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982).
'9 Id. at 818.




Id.; see supra note 5 (NLRB possesses power of review over decisions of regional
directors).
21 Id.; PPG Indus., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980). Upon receipt of PPG's request for
review, the NLRB remanded the case to the hearing officer for an evidentiary hearing on
PPG's allegations of union accountability for threats of personal and property harm. 671
F.2d at 818.
671 F.2d at 818.
Id. at 818; see Brief for Teamsters Local Union No. 391 at 4-5, PPG Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1982). The PPG evidentiary hearing lasted nine days and
received testimony from ninety-nine witnesses. Id.
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members of a union-sponsored in-plant organizing committee 4 had
threatened procompany employees with bodily harm and property
damage.25 The hearing uncovered several instances in which committee
members had threatened procompany employees in the presence of
other PPG employees.26 The hearing officer, however, found that the
company's objections lacked merit.27 The NLRB adopted the hearing of-
ficer's conclusion that the union was not accountable for the committee's
misconduct 28 and certifed the union as the employees' representative.'
On appeal" to the Fourth Circuit, PPG challenged the NLRB's ruling
24 671 F.2d at 819. The committee consisted of 300 of the 1400 PPG employees eligible
to vote. Id. PPG employees became committee members by signing a release which enabled
the union to submit the employees' names to PPG management. Id. Although committee
members wore no special insignia and did not conduct exclusive meetings, committee
members did voice support for the union at the plant and on occasion at other employees'
homes. Id.
25 Id. at 819.
26 Id. The hearing officer credited five situations in which committee members
threatened PPG employees opposed to the union. Id.; see Brief For Petitioner PPG In-
dustries, Inc. at 11-12, PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1982) (testimony
on threats of violence credited by hearing officer). First, one female employee, who recently
had revoked her union card, testified that a male committee member had threatened her
with bodily harm. 671 F.2d at 819. Second, another procompany female employee testified
that a male committee member had threatened to damage her home and automobile. Id.
Third, one procompany male employee testified that a male committee member had
threatened him with bodily injury for his opposition to the union. Id. Fourth, a procompany
employee testified that a committee member threatened to assault him if the union lost the
election. Id. Finally, a female employee testified that a male committee member threatened
to damage her automobile. Id.
Id. at 819.
Id. See generally Joint Appendix, Vol. 1-Record at 94-120, PPG Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1982). The hearing officer did not find the union account-
able for the acts of the in-plant organizing committee. Id. at 107-110; see supra note 8
(common-law of agency controls under Act). The officer, however, did note that if the union
were accountable for the acts of the committee, PPG's objections to the election would be
sustainable. Joint Appendix, Vol. 1-Record at 114. Party accountability for election in-
terference is important to the extent that accountability enables a reviewing court to accord
more weight to party misconduct when evaluating the misconduct's impact on the
laboratory conditions of the election process. NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d
1239, 1242 (4th Cir. 1976); see supra note 11 (coercive acts attributable to party to election
receive more weight when considering the impact of such act on employees' free choice).
But see supra notes 12 & 13 (laboratory conditions standard dispositive in judging election
interference); infra notes 104-30 and accompanying text (party accountability is but one fac-
tor in assessing election interference). The hearing officer further noted that the five
credited threats did not result in any physical violence. Joint Appendix, Vol. 1-Record at
114. The hearing officer also found that the voting group was large, 1400 employees, and
that the threats were spread over a three and one-half month period. Id. at 112. The hearing
officer concluded that the committee's misconduct did not create an atmosphere of fear or
confusion among the voting employees and that the threats therefore did not render
employees' free choice of representatives impossible. Id.; see supra notes 12 & 13
(laboratory conditions standard).
671 F.2d at 818, 823 n.10.
1o Id. at 818. In order to challenge the validity of the election, PPG refused to bargain
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that the committee members were not the union's agents." PPG's appeal
relied primarily upon the Fourth Circuit's decision in National Labor
Relations Board v. Georgetown Dress Corp.32 In Georgetown, the Fourth
Circuit addressed the issues of whether election interference by a pro-
union employee organizing committee3 3 was attributable to a union and
whether the election interference warranted overturning the election.
3 4
The election interference had consisted of threats of bodily harm and
property damage directed by committee members against other
Georgetown employees. 5 Since the union had authorized the
Georgetown committee to be the in-plant organizer,3 and never had
repudiated the committee's authority or misconduct,37 the Georgetown
court held the election interference attributable to the union in accord-
ance with the principle of apparent authority. 8 Finding the union
with the union. Id.; see Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-79 (1964). A federal
court cannot review an election certification directly. Id. at 476-77. If the company refuses to
comply with an NLRB order directing the company to bargain with the union, however, the
certification is reviewable in the ensuing unfair labor practice proceeding in federal court.
Id. at 478-79; see, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 154 (1941) (NLRB
certification order is reviewable in federal court incident to unfair labor practice charge);
NLRB v. Dick Seidler Enters., 666 F.2d 383, 385 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (company's refusal to
bargain with union permits review of NLRB certification in federal forum).
3' 671 F.2d at 819.
537 F.2d 1239 (4th cir. 1976).
- 537 F.2d at 1242. The Georgetown committee had consisted of pro-union employees
willing to solicit support for the union in the Georgetown plant and at the homes of other
company employees. Id.
I Id. at 1242-45. The controversy involved in Georgetown arose out of threats of
violence which preceded a union representation election. Id. at 1241-42; see infra note 35
(Georgetown committee members' threats). The union won the election by a vote of 184 to
105. 537 F.2d at 1240. Georgetown, the employer, filed objections to the election results
with the NLRB. Id. The Board, however, overruled Georgetown's objections and certified
the union as the Georgetown employees' bargaining representative. Id. Georgetown refused
to bargain with the union in order to obtain judicial review of the election certification. Id.;
see supra note 30 (federal courts cannot review NLRB certification orders directly). In
Georgetown, the Fourth Circuit ordered the election set aside since the misconduct of the
Georgetown employee committee created an atmosphere of fear and coercion which made a
fair election impossible. 537 F.2d at 1240-41; see supra notes 12 & 13 (laboratory conditions
standard).
1 537 F.2d at 1241-42. The administrative law judge in Georgetown found several
situations in which committee members threatened procompany employees. Id. at 1241.
First, prior to a company-arranged meeting, a member of the Georgetown committee pro-
duced a knife and threatened violence at the meeting. Id. Second, a committee member
threatened one employee with vandalism to the employee's car if the employee did not sup-
port the union. Id. Third, a committee member warned company employees of her intention
to disclose all employee conversations regarding unionism to the union. Id. The ad-
ministrative law judge further found that a specific committee member hovered over
employees and took notes on union conversations. Id.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1243-44.
' Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (2d ed. 1958)
[RESTATEMENT]. Section 8 of the Restatement defines apparent authority as "the power to
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accountable for the acts of the committee," the Georgetown court con-
cluded that the committee's misconduct, combined with threats from
non-identifiable sources,40 created an atmosphere of fear which had
rendered a fair election impossible. 41 The Fourth Circuit in Georgetown,
therefore, denied enforcement of the NLRB bargaining order and over-
turned the election. 2
The PPG court found Georgetown dispositive on the question of the
union's accountability for the acts of the PPG committee." In light of the
factual similarities existing between Georgetown and PPG,44 the PPG
affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly
as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to
such third persons." Id.
The Georgetown court cited comments (a)(b)&(c) of § 8 of the Restatement in support of
its conclusion that the committee possessed apparent authority to act on behalf of the union.
537 F.2d at 1244. Comment (a) provides that apparent authority results from a manifestation
by X to Y that Z is X's agent. RESTATEMENT, supra, § 8, comment a. In Georgetown, the
union's failure to repudiate the acts of the committee combined with the committee's posi-
tion as the union's only in-plant contact with the employees constituted the requisite
manifestation to the Georgetown employees that the committee had apparent authority to
act on behalf of the union. 537 F.2d at 1244. In addition, comment (b) to § 8 of the Restate-
ment permits X's manifestation to Y to occur through signs or advertising to the community.
RESTATEMENT § 8, comment b. In Georgetown, the union distributed notices which implied a
close relationship between the committee and the union. 537 F.2d at 1243. Finally, comment
(c) of § 8 of the Restatement requires that Y actually believe Z possesses X's authority before
apparent authority will arise in Z. RESTATEMENT, supra, § 8, comment c. The Georgetown
court noted that the committee's acts did not exceed their authority so far as to imply that
the committee was not the union's agent. 537 F.2d at 1244. In fact, the Georgetown court
concluded that the employees recognized the committee as the union's in-plant represen-
tative. Id.
537 F.2d at 1244. The Georgetown court noted, in reference to the judicial policy of
according more weight to party misconduct, that a finding of union accountability for the
acts of the committee was determinative in setting aside the election. Id.; see supra notes 11
& 28 (significance of party misconduct as opposed to third-person misconduct).
4" 537 F.2d at 1242. In addition to the agency relationship existing between the com-
mittee and the union, the Georgetown court noted additional factors which, combined with
the committee's misconduct, rendered a fair election impossible. Id. The court held that
threats from unidentifiable sources contributed to an atmosphere which magnified the coer-
cive impact of the committee's misconduct on employees' free choice. Id. The Georgetown
court further found that Georgetown's position as the principal employer in the area and
the lack of alternative employment elsewhere increased the employees' sensitivity to
threats of job loss. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Georgetown concluded that the poor attendance
at company sponsored meetings during the organizational campaign reflected the worker's
sensitivity to the pro-union threats. Id.
Id. at 1242, 1245; see supra notes 12 & 13 (laboratory conditions standard).
'z 537 F.2d at 1240-41, 1245.
671 F.2d at 820.
Id. at 819, 820, 822. Although the Fourth Circuit in PPG did not undertake a direct
comparison of the PPG and Georgetown controversies, factual similarities exist between
the two decisions. First, the composition and organization of the two committees are
similar. Compare 671 F.2d at 819 (PPG committee membership open) with 537 F.2d at 1242
(committee membership in Georgetown open); 671 F.2d at 819 (PPG committee members
receive no compensation) with 537 F.2d at 1242-43 (committee members in Georgetown
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court concluded that the Georgetown decision compelled a finding of
union accountability in PPG. The Fourth Circuit in PPG noted that the
union organizer, on occassion, had employed PPG committee members to
relay messages to employees within the PPG plant.46 In addition, the
court recognized that the PPG union had prepared and distributed to
employees pro-union handbills 47 which had implied a close relationship
between the committee and the union. ' Finally, the Fourth Circuit in
received no compensation); 671 F.2d at 819 (PPG committee meetings were open) with 537
F.2d at 1242 (no formal structure to Georgetown committee). Second, the misconduct of the
committees' in both cases is similar. See supra notes 26 (PPG threats); supra note 35
(Georgetown threats). Compare 671 F.2d at 819 (PPG committee misconduct consisted of
threats of bodily injury and property damage) with 537 F.2d at 1241 (Georgetown commit-
tee misconduct consisted of threats of bodily injury and property damage). Third, commit-
tee members performed similar tasks. Compare 671 F.2d at 819 (PPG committee members
solicited support for union at plant and in homes of other employees) with 537 F.2d at 1243
(Georgetowncommittee members solicited support for union at plant and in homes of other
employees). Finally, the union in both cases distributed notices to employees which implied
the existence of a close relationship between union and committee. Compare 671 F.2d at 819
(PPG notice implying close bond between union and committee) with 537 F.2d at 1243
(Georgetown notice implying close bond between union and committee).
Although PPG and Georgetown are factually similar, differences exist between the two
decisions. The union organizer in PPG disavowed the threats of a PPG committee member
while the union organizer in Georgetown never disavowed committee misconduct. Compare
671 F.2d at 820 with 537 F.2d at 1243-44. Moreover, the union organizer in PPG took a much
more active role in the election campaign than did the Georgetown organizer. Compare 671
F.2d at 819-20 (PPG union representatives were present at plant gate during campaign to
answer employee questions on unionism) with 537 F.2d at 1243 (Georgetown committee was
union's only contact with employees). Finally, the Georgetown controversy involved addi-
tional coercive conduct from unidentifiable sources while the PPG controversy involved only
the threats attributable to the committee. Compare 671 F.2d 819 (PPG election in-
terference) with 537 F.2d 1241-42 (Georgetown election interference).
671 F.2d at 820, 822-23.
" Id. at 819. The Fourth Circuit noted in a footnote that had the PPG management
directed a committee in the fashion that the union directed the PPG committee, the com-
pany would have been held accountable for the acts of the committee. Id. at 821 n.6. See
generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 8, comment a. Pursuant to comment (a) to § 8 of
the Restatement, in order for apparent authority to arise in the PPG committee the union
had to make manifestations to PPG employees that the committee represented the union's
agent. Id.; see also supra note 38 (Georgetown union's failure to repudiate committee
misconduct and committee's position as union's sole in-plant contact constituted George-
town union's manifestation to Georgetown employees that committee was union's agent).
"T See 671 F.2d at 819 (committee member names appeared on several union handbills
and one handbill referred to committee as part of union). But see id. at 822 n.7 (hearing of-
ficer noted handbill which reflected separation between union and committee). See generally
Joint Appendix, supra note 28, at 106-07; 671 F.2d at 822 n.7.
1 671 F.2d at 819; see also id. at 821 n.6 (if organizing committee in PPG had been a
procompany organization, Board would have held company accountable for committee's
misconduct). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 8, comment b. Pursuant to com-
ment (b) to § 8 of the Restatement, the union's manifestation to the PPG employees could
have occurred through signs or advertising to the community. Id.; see also supra note 38
(Georgetown union manifested its delegation of authority to committee through handbills
which implied close relationship between union and Georgetown committee).
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PPG noted that the union organizer had requested PPG committee
members to solicit support for the union in the plant, and on occasion, in
the homes of other employees.49 The court further noted that the
organizer had requested the committee to represent the "eyes and ears"
of the union during the campaign. 0 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held
the union accountable for the acts of the committee and consequently
overturned the election."
In connection with its conclusion that the Georgetown decision com-
pelled a finding of union accountability in PPG,2 the Fourth Circuit
noted that the NLRB could not disregard established circuit precedent
in their resolution of labor controversies5 s The court held that the broad
discretion accorded the NLRB by Congress54 did not include the author-
ity to disregard established circuit precedent in NLRB decisions." The
court, consequently, concluded that the NLRB must recognize the agen-
cy aspects of the Georgetown decision as binding authority on union
agency questions in the Fourth Circuit. 6
In addition to holding the NLRB bound by circuit precedent, the
PPG court interpreted the agency aspects of the Georgetown decision."
" 671 F.2d at 819; see id. at 821 n.6 (PPG union's request that committee members
solicit support for union in homes of other employees was an element in union's accountability
for acts of PPG committee).
I Id. at 819; see id. at 821 n.6 (Fourth Circuit considered union's request that PPG
committee represent union's eyes and ears fundamental to courts conclusion that committee
possessed apparent authority to act on union's behalf). See generally RESTATEMENT, supra
note 38, § 8, comment c. Comment (c) to § 8 of the Restatement requires that the PPG
employees actually believe the committee possesses the union's authority before apparent
authority will arise in the committee. Id.; see supra note 38 (Georgetown court noted that
Georgetown committee's acts did not exceed committee's supposed authority to extent that
Georgetown employees might question committee's authority); see also supra note 26 (PPG
threats); supra note 35 (Georgetown threats). Compare 671 F.2d at 819 (PPG committee
misconduct consisted of threats of bodily harm and property damage) with 537 F.2d at 1241
(Georgetown committee misconduct consisted of threats of bodily harm and property
damage).
671 F.2d at 821, 823.
52 Id. at 820-21.
5 Id.
11 Id. at 823 n.9; see supra note 5 (NLRB possesses wide discretion in representation
election certifications).
11 671 F.2d at 823 n.9; see Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) (courts rather than NLRB are final authority on statutory
construction), modified on other grounds, 392 U.S. 901 (1968); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623
F.2d 224, 228-29 (2d Cir.), (Board and hearing officers must follow circuit law), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 975 (1980); see also supra note 5 (NLRB orders subject to federal court review);
Ithaca College, 623 F.2d at 228 (NLRB possesses no greater standing than federal district
court and therefore must comply with circuit authority); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB,
608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) (decisions by federal appellate courts are binding on all in-
ferior courts and administrative bodies); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766 (5th
Cir. 1974) (established law of circuit binding on NLRB).
56 671 F.2d at 820-21; see supra note 38 (Georgetown agency analysis).
" Id. at 822 n.8.
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According to the PPG court, the absence of a professional union
organizer at the Georgetown plant was not the determinative factor in
the Georgetown agency analysis." The PPG court wrote that the
absence of a professional full time union organizer in Georgetown was
only one factor in the Georgetown court's holding.59 The PPG court con-
cluded that the proper approach in analyzing union agency questions in
representation elections is to consider the totality of circumstances and
to accord no single factor determinative weight." The PPG court held
that the standard for determining a union's accountability for the acts of
an organizing committee is whether the amount of association between the
union and the organizing committee is significant enough to justify charg-
ing the union with the conduct of the committee." Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit in PPG, after considering the totality of circumstances,62 held the
union accountable for the committee's misconduct and set aside the elec-
tion. 3
The Fourth Circuit in PPG properly concluded that the NLRB could
not disregard the decisions of the federal circuit court in the circuit in
which the action was pending.64 Since the NLRB is only an ad-
ministrative agency,15 the Board must defer to the courts on matters of
statutory interpretation. Congress, moreover, has entrusted the
federal circuit courts with the power and authority to enforce, modify, or
overturn NLRB orders. 7 The NLRB, therefore, must recognize as con-
trolling the law of the circuit in which the labor dispute arose.68
58 Id.
59 Id.; see Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 1981) (reading deter-
minative factor in Georgetown to be absence of a professional union organizer at plant);
Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 500, 510 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977) (absence of union
organizer dispositive in Georgetown decision).
671 F.2d at 822 n.8.
61 Id.
Id. at 819-23.
Id. at 821, 823.
671 F.2d at 820-21..
See generally supra note 5 (history and procedures of NLRB).
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 565-66 (1979) (courts
rather than NLRB have final word on matters of statutory interpretation); Securities &
Exch. Comm'n v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (courts rather than administrative agencies
have final say on matters of statutory interpretation); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (matters of statutory interpretation are within sole province of
judiciary); see also Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.) (NLRB must follow
circuit precedent), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608
F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) (Board must follow law of circuit).
17 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976) (NLRB must appeal to federal circuit courts for enforce-
ment of NLRB orders); id. § 160(f) (1976) (federal circuit courts grant litigants relief from
Board orders).
' 671 F.2d at 820-21, see Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 862 (7th
Cir. 1980) (NLRB must recognize law of circuit); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d
1245, 1252 (5th Cir. 1978) (NLRB must recognize law of circuit since circuit court alone can
enforce Board orders); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1974) (NLRB
must follow circuit law); Morand Bros. Beverage v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1953)
(Board is similar to a district court and must apply law of circuit).
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The Fourth Circuit also properly held the union accountable for the
acts of the PPG organizing committee. 9 The determination of an agent-
principal relationship is a question of fact.7" An appellate court need not
accept NLRB factual findings unless substantial evidence in support of
those findings exists in the record considered as a whole.7 According to
the Supreme Court, the substantial evidence test consists of whether
the evidence considered as a whole reasonably supports the Board's con-
clusions.72 An appellate court, consequently, can overturn an NLRB deci-
sion whenever substantial evidence opposed to the Board's decision
exists.1
3
Substantial evidence supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that
the union was accountable for the PPG committee's misconduct.74 The
union organizer's request that the PPG committee members represent
the union's eyes and ears supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that
the union was accountable for the committee's threats.75 Courts confront-
ing the agency issue consistently have found a union's authorization of
an employee organizing committee influential in holding the union ac-
countable for the committee's misconduct. For example, in National
Labor Relations Board v. Georgetown Dress Corp.,77 a union organizer
69 671 F.2d at 821.
' Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 366 (10th Cir. 1982); see supra note 38
(union agency principles).
7" See Worley Mills Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 364 (10th Cir. 1982) (in order to over-
turn NLRB bargaining order record must be devoid of substantial evidence in support of
Board's position); Jamesway Corp. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 63,66-67 (3d Cir. 1982) (proper standard
for reviewing NLRB factual findings is substantial evidence test rather than abuse of
discretion test); Zeiglers Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000, 1008 (3d Cir. 1981)
(NLRB factual findings are subject to substantial evidence test on review). But cf. NLRB v.
A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1946) (standard for reviewing NLRB orders is
whether Board abused discretion accorded NLRB by Congress); Emerson Elec. Co. v.
NLRB, 649 F.2d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 1981) (NLRB decisions are subject to abuse of discretion
standard on review); NLRB v. Urban Tel. Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1974) (standard
of review is whether Board abused its discretion in arriving at its decision); Intertype Co. v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 45 (4th Cir. 1968) (abuse of discretion is standard for reviewing NLRB
orders), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969). See generally supra note 5 (procedure for review-
ing NLRB orders).
72 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951), quoting NLRB v. Colum-
bian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
"a Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); see Jamesway Corp. v.
NLRB, 676 F.2d 63, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussion of various appellate standards for review
of NLRB orders).
"' 671 F.2d at 819-21; see supra text accompanying notes 44-50 (evidence which sup-
ports holding union accountable for committee's threats).
" 671 F.2d at 819.
7 Id. at 821; see infra text accompanying notes 77-98 (significance of union authorization of
employee organizing committees). But cf. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1326,
1329 (1980) (members of employee organizing committees are not agents of union simply
because of their membership in committee).
" 537 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976); see supra text accompanying notes 32-42 (Georgetown
decision).
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requested an employee organizing committee to represent the union
within the Georgetown plant.78 In holding the union accountable for the
Georgetown committee's misconduct,79 the Fourth Circuit noted that the
union organizer had authorized, and the Georgetown employees had
perceived, the committee members as the union's representative."
In Worley Mills, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,8 a recent
decision construing both PPG and Georgetown, the Tenth Circuit also
noted the significance a union's authorization of an employee has in the
determination of the union's accountability for an employee's miscon-
duct." In Worley Mills, the Tenth Circuit addressed the agency ques-
tions in the context of whether the union was accountable for a pro-union
employee's electioneering near the polls on election day. 3 The pro-union
employee had been the employee responsible for introducing the union
into the plant.' The employee also had campaigned actively by soliciting
support for the union, discussing unionism with other employees, attend-
ing union meetings, and serving as the union's translator for the
Spanish-speaking employees.85 In upholding the Board's certification of
the Worley union, the Tenth Circuit noted that no reason existed to hold
the union accountable for the misconduct of the employee since no
evidence existed that the union had appointed, authorized, or solicited
the employee to represent the union within the mill. 8
The Worley Mills court also distinguished the agency applications of
both the PPG and Georgetown decisions. 7 According to the Tenth Cir-
cuit, the PPG committee's apparent authority8 resulted from the PPG
union organizer's request that the committee solicit support for the
union and that the committee represent the union's eyes and ears during
the election campaign. 9 In addition, the Tenth Circuit in Worley Mills
wrote that the Georgetown union's accountability for the acts of the
Georgetown committee resulted from the union's failure to take an ac-
tive role in the organization of the plant,"0 and from the union's failure to
78 537 F.2d 1242-43.
79 Id. at 1244; see supra note 35 (Georgetown committee misconduct).
1 537 F.2d at 1244; see Abbott Laboratories v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 662, 666-67 (4th Cir.
1976) (principal pro-union employee was not union agent since union never authorized
employee).






" Id. at 366-67.
" See supra note 38 (apparent authority defined).
685 F.2d at 367.
" Id. The active role taken by the PPG union to organize PPG employees was not
dispositive of the union's accountability for the PPG committee's misconduct. 671 F.2d at
821-22; see NLRB v. Advanced Syss., Inc., 681 F.2d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 1982) (evidence sup-
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repudiate the misconduct of the Georgetown committee. 1 Concluding
that Georgetown and PPG were distinguishable on the facts, the Tenth
Circuit did not hold the Worley Mills union accountable for the pro-union
employee's electioneering.2
In National Labor Relations Board v. Advanced Systems, Inc.,93 the
Ninth Circuit also considered a union's request that an employee repre-
sent the union an essential element in the establishment of apparent
authority in the employee. 4 In Advanced Systems, a member of a pro-
union organizing committee had threatened another employee with bodily
harm. 5 The evidence supported the conclusion that the union had ap-
pointed the pro-union employee a member of an organizing committee
and had requested the employee to solicit support for the union. 6 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the evidence presented a substantial and
material issue of whether the pro-union employee had apparent authority
to act on the union's behalf. 7 The court, therefore, remanded the case to
the Board for an evidentiary hearing on the election objections.
In addition to the PPG organizer's request that the PPG committee
members represent the union's eyes and ears during the campaign, the
PPG organizer's employment of the committee to relay messages to
ported apparent authority of pro-union employee despite presence of professional
organizers at plant); Methodist Home v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173, 1182-83 (4th Cir. 1979)
(although union officials established office in local motel to answer employee questions on
unionism, pro-union employee's misconduct attributable to union since pro-union employee
had greater exposure and visibility to other employees than union officials had).
"' 685 F.2d at 367. The union organizer in PPG had disavowed a threat made by one of
the committee members to another PPG employee. 671 F.2d at 820; see Abbott
Laboratories v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 662, 667 (4th Cir. 1976) (election enforced since union had no
notice of pro-union employee's misconduct and therefore no opportunity to disavow miscon-
duct); NLRB v. Urban Tel. Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 243, 244 (7th Cir. 1974) (representation elec-
tion set aside since union did not disavow pro-union employee's misconduct and company
employee's had associated pro-union employees with union); NLRB v. Tampa Crown
Distribs., Inc., 272 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1959) (agency relationship existed between union
and source of anonymous threats since union had not disavowed threats).
685 F.2d at 366-67.
91 681 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1982).
1, Id. at 576. In Advanced Systems, the Ninth Circuit noted additional evidence which
supported holding the union accountable for a pro-union employee's misconduct. Id. First,
the employee's name had appeared on union leaflets which the committee had distributed to
the other employees. Id.; see supra note 47 (PPG committee member names had appeared
on union handbills). Moreover, the other employees in the plant had regarded the employee
as the union's principal spokesman. 681 F.2d at 576. In addition, the union as well as the pro-
union employee had suggested that the employee would be the shop steward after the elec-
tion. Id. Finally, evidence also suggested that the employee had relayed messages between
the union and the employees. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 46,(PPG committee had
relayed messages between union and employees).
, 681 F.2d at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
97 Id.
"' Id. at 577.
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other PPG employees supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the
union was accountable for the acts of the committee.99 In National Labor
Relations Board v. Urban Telephone Corp.,'10 the Seventh Circuit con-
fronted the issue of whether election interference by a pro-union
employee necessitated setting aside a representation election."' The
election interference consisted of threats of bodily harm and property
damage. 2 In setting the election aside, the Seventh Circuit noted that
the pro-union employee had conveyed information between the union
and the employees.' 3
Although substantial evidence"0 4 supports the Fourth Circuit's deter-
mination that the union was accountable for the PPG committee's
misconduct,"5 the record lacks substantial evidence in support of the
court's conclusion that the committee misconduct interfered with the
laboratory conditions' °6 of the election. ' The laboratory conditions stand-
ard requires a reviewing court to scrutinize the record in order to deter-
mine whether election misconduct disruptive of employees' free choice
interfered with the election.' 8 Appellate courts consider the totality of
circumstances involved in an election proceeding in determining
whether election interference had breached the laboratory conditions of
the election.' 9
The Third Circuit in Zeiglers Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Board,"' held several factors helpful in assessing
whether election misconduct had interfered with the laboratory condi-
tions of an election proceeding."' In Zeigler, a pro-union employee
repeatedly threatened other Zeigler employees within two weeks of a
" 671 F.2d at 819.
"0I 499 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1974).
'o, Id. at 240-41.
, Id. at 241-42.
'0 Id. at 241; see Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 366-67 (10th Cir. 1982)
(NLRB bargaining order enforced since misconduct not attributable to union). The Tenth
Circuit in Worley Mills concluded that the facts presented in Urban Telephone had
established the Urban Telephone union's accountability for the threats of the employee. Id.
at 367; see also NLRB v. Advanced Syss., Inc., 681 F.2d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 1982) (hearing
granted since pro-union employee had conveyed information between union and employees).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 70-73 (substantial evidence test is standard for
reviewing NLRB factual findings).
OI See supra text accompanying notes 74-76 (substantial evidence in support of Fourth
Circuit's conclusion on union accountability in PPG).
10 See supra notes 12-13 (laboratory conditions standard).
10 671 F.2d at 818-20.
,o0 See supra notes 12-13 (laboratory conditions standard).
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941); see Intertype Co. v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 46 (4th Cir. 1968) (in assessing impact threat had on employees' free
choice court must consider totality of circumstances), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969).
"1 639 F.2d 1000 (3d Cir. 1981).
.. Id. at 1005. According to the Zeigler court, the number and severity of the threats,
the proximity of threats to election, the closeness of election, whether the threats affected
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representation election. " 2 The Third Circuit concluded that the pro-
union employee's threats' interfered with Zeigler employees' free
choice of a bargaining representative."' According to the Zeigler court,
the election results had been very close," 5 the threats had occurred
within two weeks of the election,"8 and the threats had been serious,
creating fear in the minds of the voting employees." 7 The Third Circuit,
therefore, denied enforcement of the NLRB bargaining order and set
aside the election.
1 8
In PPG, on the other hand, the facts do not support the Fourth Cir-
cuit's holding that the committee's misconduct interfered with the
laboratory conditions of the election proceedings."9 Although the court
correctly decided that the union was accountable for the committee's
misconduct,"' an appellate court must consider the totality of cir-
cumstances in assessing whether election misconduct interfered with
all employees, and whether the threats were attributable to a party are factors helpful in
assessing whether certain threats interfered with the laboratory conditions of an election
proceeding. Id.
. Id. at 1003.
. See id. at 1003 (pro-union employee misconduct consisted of threats of bodily injury
directed at Zeigler employees).
.. Id. at 1011.
... Id. at 1002, 1009-10 (union prevailed in Zeigler by vote of 16 to 14); see Methodist
Home v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173, 1184 (4th Cir. 1979) (closeness of vote was influential in
court's denial of NLRB bargaining order); NLRB v. Urban Tel. Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 244 (7th
Cir. 1974) (17 to 15 union majority was influential in court's decision to set election aside);
Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346, 1350 (1st Cir. 1971) (close vote was influential in
court's decision to set aside election); Collins & Aikman Corp. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 722, 724.
729-30 (4th Cir. 1967) (13 to 12 election results were influential in court's decision to set aside
election). But see Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 364, 369 (10th Cir. 1982) (NLRB
bargaining order enforced despite close election); Abbott Laboratories v. NLRB, 540 F.2d
662, 664, 667 (4th Cir. 1976) (same).
"' 639 F.2d at 1002-03, 1009; see Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 589, 595 (8th Cir.
1981) (five threats occurring during ten week election campaign held insufficient to set elec-
tion aside); Methodist Home v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173, 1179, 1184-85 (4th Cir. 1979) (pro-union
employee's assault of procompany employee on eve of election created fear in minds of
other employees sufficient to remand case to NLRB for evidentiary hearing); Cross Baking
Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (1st Cir. 1971) (physical assault occurring two months
before election had not created fear in minds of voting employees).
"17 639 F.2d at 1003, 1009; see NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1242,
1245 (4th Cir. 1976) (threats of bodily harm and property damage created fear in minds of
employees and constituted grounds for setting election aside); NLRB v. Urban Tel. Corp.,
499 F.2d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1974) (pro-union employees' threat of bodily harm created fear in
minds of other employees rendering election a nullity).
118 639 F.2d at 1011.
19 671 F.2d at 819.
o See supra text accompanying notes 74-76 (substantial evidence supports PPG
court's holding union accountable for committee's activity in PPG); supra text accompany-
ing note 11 (more weight accorded to party misconduct).
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the laboratory conditions of an election proceeding."' In PPG, the elec-
tion results were not close." The union prevailed by a vote of 698 to
639." 1 Furthermore, the PPG committee threats were not numerous.24
The hearing officer credited only five situations in which committee
members directed threats at other PPG employees." Moreover, the
PPG committee misconduct did not occur close to the election.2 " The five
credited situations occurred during a three and one-half month campaign
in which over 1300 employees voted." In addition, the hearing officer's
report revealed that the PPG committee member's threats did not
frighten the PPG employees." Finally, none of the PPG threats resulted
in physical violence." The Fourth Circuit, consequently, erred in setting
aside the PPG election, since the record contained substantial evidence
in support of the NLRB's decision to uphold the PPG representation
election."'
Not only is the Fourth Circuit's decision to set aside the PPG elec-
tion unsupported by the facts, but the court's holding is also incorrect
since the holding involved a misconception of the issues."'l The PPG
court initially framed the issue as whether the NLRB's certification of
the union as the employees' bargaining representative was proper."'
"' See supra text accompanying note 109 (totality of circumstances test).
1 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (effect of close election on laboratory con-
ditions standard).
'2 671 F.2d at 818.
' See supra note 111 (effect of numerous threats on laboratory conditions standard).
"7 671 F.2d at 819.
' See supra note 116 and accompanying text (effect of proximity of threats to election
to laboratory conditions standard).
" Brief for The National Labor Relations Board at 15-16, PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB,
671 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982).
"I Joint Appendix, supra note 28, at 936, 111, 112, 844; supra note 117 and accompany-
ing text (seriousness of threats on laboratory conditions standard).
" 671 F.2d at 819-20; see Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 589, 594-95 (8th Cir.
1981) (NLRB bargaining order enforced since election interference had not resulted in
physical violence); NLRB v. Van Gorp Corp., 615 F.2d 759, 764, 766 (8th Cir. 1980) (election
set aside since threats culminated in an act of physical violence); Abbott Laboratories v.
NLRB, 540 F.2d 662, 665-67 (4th Cir. 1976) (rough talk not sufficient to set election aside).
But see NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (4th Cir. 1976) (organizing
committee threats sufficient to set aside election); Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346,
1348-49 (1st Cir. 1971) (physical assault two-months before election did not interfere with
laboratory conditions).
'" 671 F.2d at 819-20. The Georgetown decision does not compel the Fourth Circuit in
PPG to conclude that the PPG committee threats had interferred with the laboratory condi-
tions since PPG and Georgetown are distinguishable. See supra text accompanying note 40
(presence of additional threats from non-identifiable sources in Georgetown differentiates
Georgetown decision from PPG in terms of laboratory conditions review); supra note 40 &
44 (same).
671 F.2d at 818-19.
' Id. at 818.
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The Fourth Circuit, however, proceeded to decide the merits of the case
pursuant to whether the union was accountable for the misconduct of the
committee members." Underlying the court's determination of the issue
as one of agency is the assumption that misconduct attributable to a party
in a representation election has more impact on the employees than con-
duct attributable to third persons."4 Courts and the Board, however, con-
sistently have held the decisive factor in reviewing election misconduct
to be whether the misconduct created fear or anxiety in the minds of the
voting employees and not whether a party is accountable for the election
interference."5
By placing too much emphasis on the agency question, the Fourth
Circuit in PPG failed to subject the committee's election misconduct to
the laboratory conditions standard."3 ' Courts and the Board consider the
existence of a free and uncoerced election environment in which employ-
ees can express freely their preferences for or against union representa-
tion dispositive in the resolution of representation election questions.37
Although the concept of agency is one factor in the proper review of an
election proceeding,13 8 the principal-agent relationship is not the controll-
ing factor in determining whether election interference warrants over-
turning an election.'39 The destruction of the laboratory conditions con-
ducive to a free election is the principal question in the proper review of
a representation election and the Fourth Circuit erred in not addressing
this question in PPG."4 I
WILLIAM RANDALL SPALDING
3 Id. at 818-21.
'" See supra note 11 (courts and Board accord less weight to third-person election in-
terference).
13 See Zeiglers Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 1000, 1007-08 (3d Cir. 1981)
(question is not culpability of union but whether atmosphere of fear and confusion existed in
fact); Methodist Home v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173, 1183 (4th Cir. 1979) (laboratory conditions
standard looks to effect of threats on employees' free choice rather than to source of
threats); Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346, 1348 (1st Cir. 1971) (existence of coercive
atmosphere rather than culpability of union is dispositive in laboratory condition analysis);
Home Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1967) (laboratory conditions
standard looks to existence of coercive atmosphere rather than to party accountability in
determining effect of election interference on employees' free choice).
.36 See 671 F.2d at 818-23 (PPG opinion contains no mention of laboratory conditions
standard).
133 See supra notes 12 & 13 (laboratory conditions standard).
138 See supra notes 11 & 38 (agent-principal relationship helpful in assessing effect
threats had on employees' free choice); supra note 11 (courts and Board accord more weight
to election interference attributable to party).
" See supra text accompanying notes 12 & 13 (employees' free choice dispositive in
determining whether to set aside election).
"0 See supra text accompanying notes 119-130 (PPG court failed to address laboratory
conditions standard).
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